Capturing the Judiciary: Carhart and the Undue Burden Standard by Bridges, Khiara
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
9-13-2011 
Capturing the Judiciary: Carhart and the Undue Burden Standard 
Khiara Bridges 
Boston Univeristy School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Khiara Bridges, Capturing the Judiciary: Carhart and the Undue Burden Standard, 67 Washington & Lee 
Law Review 915 (2011). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/473 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access 
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty 
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more 
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.  










67 Washington & Lee Law Review 915 (2010) 
Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 11-40 
(September 13, 2011) 
 





















Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926699
 
915 
Capturing the Judiciary:  Carhart and the 
Undue Burden Standard 
Khiara M. Bridges∗ 
Abstract 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,1 the 
Supreme Court replaced the trimester framework, first articulated nineteen 
years earlier in Roe v. Wade,2 with a new test for determining the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations—the "undue burden standard."3  
The Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart4 was its most recent 
occasion to use the undue burden standard, as the Court was called upon to 
ascertain the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, a 
federal statute proscribing certain methods of performing second- and 
third-trimester abortions.5  A majority of the Court held that the regulation 
was constitutionally permissible, finding that it did not impose an undue 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Anthropology, Boston 
University.  Ph.D. (anthropology), Columbia University; J.D., Columbia Law School; B.A., 
Spelman College.  Thanks to Pamela Bridgewater, Ariela Dubler, Katherine Franke, 
Suzanne Goldberg, Henry Monaghan, Carol Sanger, Anna Marie Smith, Kendall Thomas, as 
well as participants in the Gender and Sexuality Law Program’s 2009 Colloquium at 
Columbia Law School, for helpful comments and suggestions.  Thanks are also owed to the 
Center for Reproductive Rights and Columbia Law School for providing financial support 
during the writing of this Article. 
 1. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (upholding 
a woman’s right to an abortion and creating the undue burden standard to protect that right).  
 2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman has a right to 
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, but that a state may regulate areas protected by 
this right in the interests of safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and 
protecting fetal life). 
 3. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue 
burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the 
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.").  
 4. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157, 163–64 (2007) (finding the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act constitutional because the state’s interests in protecting the dignity 
of "the life within the woman" and the "dignity and reputation" of doctors who perform 
partial-birth abortions outweighed the need for maintaining the availability of the intact 
dilation and evacuation (intact D&E) procedure). 
 5. See id. at 155 (assessing the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
Act).  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926699
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burden on a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.6  In order to 
determine why it is that the undue burden standard has been incapable of 
striking down laws that limit a woman’s ability to elect an abortion, this 
Article conducts a close reading of Carhart.  The close reading reveals 
Carhart to be, at base, a logically sound opinion; however, its primary and 
fundamental weakness is that it proceeds from a highly problematic and 
disputed assumption—namely, that the fetus is a morally–consequential 
entity.  It is this magnificently undecided presupposition that forms the 
basis of the Carhart majority’s argument that abortion harms women,7 a 
contention for which the decision has gained notoriety.  Furthermore, the 
undue burden standard has come to reflect this presupposition inasmuch as 
the standard, too, presupposes the inherent "life" and moral value of the 
fetus.  As such, this Article argues that the undue burden standard has 
become ineffective because, built into it at present, are assumptions about 
the always already valuable "life" of the fetus that, in any given instance, 
overdetermine the questions that the Court asks when weighing the 
constitutionality of a regulation that limits abortion by protecting fetal 
"life."  When the standard presupposes the existence of a valuable fetal 
"life," it is likely that any legislation aimed at protecting that "life" will 
pass constitutional muster.  The Article attempts to rehabilitate the 
standard by proposing an "agnostic undue burden standard"—that is, an 
undue burden standard that proceeds from the assumption that the moral 
status of the fetus is not known.  The agnostic undue burden standard would 
ensure that the state corrupts neither the pregnant woman’s ability to 
contemplate the moral status of the fetus that she carries nor her ability to 
contemplate whether the moral status so accorded should affect her 
decision to continue her pregnancy.  If reconceptualized in the way that this 
Article proposes, an undue burden might be thought to reference those 
measures that impose upon the woman a conception of the inherent, moral 
value of fetal life—in derogation of her own personal views concerning 
fetal life, or in derogation of whether she believes that those views should 
determine the trajectory that her pregnancy takes. 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See id. ("The Act does not on its face impose a substantial obstacle, and we reject 
this further facial challenge to its validity.").  
 7. See id. at 159–60 ("It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice 
to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she 
learns, only after the event, what she once did not know . . . ."). 
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I.  Introduction 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,8 the 
Supreme Court replaced the trimester framework, first articulated nineteen 
years earlier in Roe v. Wade,9 with a new test for determining the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations—the "undue burden standard."10  
The Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart11 was its most recent 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (upholding 
a woman’s right to an abortion and creating the undue burden standard to protect that right). 
 9. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman has a right to 
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, but that a state may regulate areas protected by 
this right in the interests of safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and 
protecting fetal life). 
 10. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 ("To protect the central right recognized by Roe v. 
Wade while at the same time accommodating the State’s profound interest in potential life, 
we will employ the undue burden analysis."); see also id. ("An undue burden exists, and 
therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability."). 
 11. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157, 163–64 (2007) (finding the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act constitutional because the state’s interests in protecting the dignity 
of "the life within the woman" and the "dignity and reputation" of doctors who perform 
partial-birth abortions outweighed the need for maintaining the availability of the intact 
dilation and evacuation (intact D&E) procedure). 
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occasion to use the undue burden standard, as the Court was called upon to 
ascertain the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, a 
federal statute proscribing certain methods of performing second- and third-
trimester abortions.12  In a fascinating opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, 
a majority of the Court held that the regulation was constitutionally 
permissible, finding that it did not impose an undue burden on a woman’s 
right to terminate her pregnancy.13 
Carhart reveals that the undue burden standard, as currently 
formulated, is incapable of defending the abortion right from being 
diminished by incrementalist legislation.14  The first aim of this Article is to 
identify, precisely, the features of the undue burden standard that make it 
ineffective protection of the abortion right;15 the second aim of the paper is 
to rehabilitate the standard by excising those problematic features and 
proposing a model that better accords with Casey and U.S. Constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See id. at 141 ("Any physician who knowingly performs a partial birth abortion 
and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
two years, or both." (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 ed., Supp. IV))). 
 13. See id. (finding that the "Act does not on its face impose a substantial obstacle"). 
 14. In her concurrence in Stenberg v. Carhart, which struck down a similar statute 
criminalizing certain methods of performing second and third trimester abortions, Justice 
Ginsburg described such bans as incrementalist methods designed to enervate the abortion 
right. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  Citing a 
dissenting opinion written by Judge Posner, Justice Ginsburg noted that the criminalization 
of the abortion method at issue was "‘not because the procedure kills the fetus, not because it 
risks worse complications for the woman than alternative procedures would do, not because 
it is a crueler or more painful or more disgusting method of terminating a pregnancy.’"  Id. at 
951–52 (citations omitted).  Instead, she writes, "the law prohibits the procedure because the 
State legislators seek to chip away at the private choice shielded by Roe v. Wade, even as 
modified by Casey."  Id. at 952. 
Siegel offers an excellent exploration of Carhart as the product of an antiabortion 
social movement motivated by the belief that seeking a gradual diminishment of the abortion 
right, as opposed to seeking an outright ban, would be the more successful political strategy.  
See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:  Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1707–12 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity].  Siegel 
noted that "the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was of a piece with prevailing antiabortion 
strategy," as the movement, faced with lack of popular support for the Human Life 
Amendment, "began to develop strategies to reverse Roe incrementally, through legislation 
and litigation that would erode support for abortion one step at a time."  Id. at 1709.  Siegel 
also discusses how the incrementalist strategy has produced major rifts in the antiabortion 
movement.  See id. at 1709–10 n.51 (quoting one antiabortion advocate who called 
incrementalism the "devil’s work" and emphasized that each "cleverly crafted incremental 
legislative initiative[] ends with a tiny unspoken caveat:  ‘. . . and then you can kill the 
baby’"). 
 15. See infra Part II.A–III (describing the problems with the current undue burden 
standard).  
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law.16  The argument, then, is not that the undue burden standard is 
inherently incapable of defending the abortion right from being weakened.17  
Rather, the argument is that, in its current formulation, the undue burden 
standard is unable to preserve what is still recognized within constitutional 
law as an important, if not a fundamental, right; accordingly, the standard 
must be reconfigured if it is to provide the protection that women need and 
the Constitution demands. 
In order to identify the source of the undue burden standard’s current 
weakness, I undertake a close reading of Carhart and analyze the operation 
of the undue burden standard within the majority opinion.18  This 
investigation reveals Carhart to be, at base, a logically sound opinion; 
however, its primary and fundamental weakness is that it proceeds from a 
highly problematic and disputed assumption—namely, that the fetus is a 
morally consequential entity.  Specifically, the opinion in Carhart is written 
as if the majority knows that the fetus has/is an inherently valuable 
"life"19—as if the moral status of the fetus has been decided.20  It is this 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See infra Part III (suggesting revisions to the current standard).  
 17. See infra Part IV.A (explaining how a revised undue burden standard would 
operate effectively).  
 18. See infra Part II (providing a close analysis of Carhart).  
 19. I use quotations around the word "life" when I am not using the term to signify the 
(relatively) morally neutral capacity possessed by living biological organisms.  The 
quotation marks index a reference to the "life" that has moral, theological, and/or spiritual 
significance—a notion of "life" that some believe is simultaneous to the biological life of the 
living organism.  See infra Part II.B (discussing the conflation of biological life with moral 
life). 
 20. It is important to note at the outset that I assume that the position that the Court 
has taken regarding the fetus is an entirely moral position—as opposed to a religious or 
theological position.  See infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the debate 
surrounding whether the view that the fetus is morally consequential should always be 
understood as a religious position or whether it could also be understood as a purely moral 
position).  Furthermore, I assume that, although this position may be informed by religion or 
theology, it remains capable of being described as a secular and moral position.  Justice 
White has articulated eloquently the secular basis for concluding that the fetus is a morally 
significant entity: 
[O]ne must at least recognize, first, that the fetus is an entity that bears in its 
cells all the genetic information that characterizes a member of the species homo 
sapiens and distinguishes an individual member of that species from all others, 
and second, that there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus from a child or, 
indeed, an adult human being . . . .  [T]he continued existence and 
development—that is to say, the life—of such an entity are so directly at stake in 
the woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy . . . . 
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 (1986) 
(White, J., dissenting). 
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magnificently undecided (and potentially undecidable) presupposition that 
forms the basis of the Carhart majority’s argument that abortion harms 
women,21 a contention for which the decision has gained notoriety.22  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, asserted the simple truth of this 
argument:  "[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to 
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.  
Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow."23  However, the 
argument that abortion harms women rests on the presupposition that the 
fetus is a morally consequential entity of the highest degree.  Furthermore, 
the undue burden standard in Carhart reflects this presupposition inasmuch 
as the standard, too, presupposes the inherent "life" and moral value of the 
fetus.24  As such, this Article argues that the undue burden standard is 
ineffective because, built into it at present, are assumptions about the 
always already valuable "life" of the fetus that, in any given instance, 
overdetermine the questions that the Court asks when weighing the 
constitutionality of a regulation that protects fetal "life."25  When the 
                                                                                                                 
 21. In arguing that abortion harms women, the Court states: 
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must 
struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, 
only after the event, what she once did not know:  that she allowed a doctor to 
pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a 
child assuming the human form. 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007). 
 22. See infra note 36 (discussing several commentators’ criticism of the Court’s 
conclusion that abortion harms women). 
 23. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.  Justice Ginsberg, writing in dissent, disputes the 
facticity of the claim that abortion harms women as well as indicates its origin in 
antiabortion social movements.  See id. at 158 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court 
invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence:  
Women who have abortions come to regret their choices, and consequently suffer from 
‘[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.’").  Reva Siegel offers a helpful compendium of 
studies disproving any innate link between induced abortion and psychological damage or 
trauma.  See Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons:  Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of 
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1653 n.44 (2008) 
[hereinafter Siegel, The Right’s Reasons] (listing several such studies); see also id. at 1668–
73 (describing how the abortion-harms-women argument was developed strategically and 
deployed by an anti-abortion social movement seeking to present itself as concerned with the 
woman as much as it was concerned with the fetus and, in so doing, to build its base of 
supporters); Siegel, Dignity, supra note 14, at 1726–33 (demonstrating how the antiabortion 
movement has advanced the claim "not only that women will be harmed by abortion but that 
they have been pushed into abortions they do not want and misled into abortions they will 
regret").  
 24. See infra Part II.B (explaining Carhart’s understanding of the value of "life"). 
 25. See infra Part III (describing how the notion of "life" corrupts the undue burden 
standard). 
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standard presupposes the existence of a valuable fetal "life," it is likely that 
any legislation aimed at protecting that "life" will pass constitutional 
muster. 
As a solution to this predicament, this Article proposes that the 
assumption that the moral status of the fetus is known and that the Supreme 
Court knows it can be replaced by a skepticism towards the knowability of 
this question.26  Likewise, the undue burden standard should be similarly 
ambivalent towards the question of whether the fetus is/has a "life."  The 
skepticism that I propose would counsel that the undue burden standard 
should assume that the moral status of the fetus is not known (and may not 
ever be known).  I refer to the latter formulation as the "agnostic" version of 
the undue burden standard.  I propose that an agnosticism towards the 
question of fetal life will revitalize the undue burden standard, thereby 
enabling it to competently protect the abortion right from further 
diminishment.  The agnostic undue burden standard that I propose would 
ensure that there exists a space around the abortion decision wherein a 
woman would be free to decide whether and when over the course of her 
pregnancy she will grant the fetus a consequential moral status, and if so, 
whether she will allow the moral status so granted to determine the 
trajectory of her pregnancy.  The agnostic undue burden standard would 
create conditions within which a moral pluralism could develop around the 
fetus and abortion, more generally.  Differently stated, a space of moral 
pluralism should surround the exercise of a right as important as the 
abortion right; it is this space that a morally neutral—indeed, an agnostic—
undue burden standard patrols. 
Part II conducts a close reading of Carhart, placing the argument that 
abortion harms women within the larger conceptual apparatus erected by 
Congress and affirmed by the Court in its review of the federal Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act.  This Part reveals that the foundational assumption upon 
which the majority’s logic rests is the presupposition that the moral status 
of the fetus is objectively knowable and, further, that the Court knows it.  
Part III continues the discussion by exploring how the Court’s confidence 
with regard to the moral status of the fetus—that is, that the fetus is a 
morally consequential "life"—has been incorporated into the undue burden 
standard.  This Part argues that such an incorporation overdetermines the 
questions that the Court asks with the standard, making the standard 
incapable of defending the abortion right from being diminished by fetal 
"life"-protective measures.  This Part goes on to describe an alternative 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See infra Part III (suggesting a new undue burden standard).  
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undue burden standard that does not proceed with the same assumptions 
regarding the fetus’s moral status.  This alternative standard, the agnostic 
undue burden standard, would ensure that the state does not corrupt the 
woman’s ability to decide for herself what moral status her fetus has and 
the consequences thereof.  Part IV describes the agnostic undue burden 
standard in action—demonstrating how it would be used to adjudicate the 
constitutionality of several fetal "life"-protective laws that have been, or 
may be, passed by various states.  A brief conclusion follows in Part V. 
II.  A Close Reading of Carhart 
In Carhart, the Court was called upon to determine the 
constitutionality of the "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003" [PBA], a 
federal statute that prohibited second- and third-trimester "intact D&E" 
procedures27 by imposing criminal sanctions on physicians using the 
method.28  The immediate precursor to Carhart was the Court’s decision in 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 124 (2007) (explaining the history of the 
Act and the previous decisions on abortion).  "Dilation and evacuation" procedures are most 
commonly used to perform abortions taking place after the first trimester.  Most first 
trimester abortions are accomplished with a vacuum aspiration procedure, during which the 
physician empties the contents of the uterus with a suctioning device.  See Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923 (2004) (noting that ninety percent of all abortions take place in 
the first trimester and that the most predominant method for first trimester abortions is 
"vacuum aspiration"). 
 28. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 141.  The most relevant provisions of the statute, cited in 
Carhart are the following: 
(a) Any physician who . . . knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and 
thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 2 years, or both.  This subsection does not apply to a partial-birth abortion 
that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a 
physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, . . . 
(b) As used in this section— 
(1) the term ‘partial-birth abortion’ means an abortion in which the person 
performing the abortion— 
(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the 
case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the 
mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the 
navel is outside the body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an overt 
act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and  
(B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the 
partially delivered living fetus; . . .  
 . . . . 
(e) A woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is performed may not be 
prosecuted under this section . . . . 
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Stenberg v. Carhart;29—a case in which the Court was called upon to 
determine the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that similarly 
prohibited certain methods of second- and third-trimester abortions.  The 
Court in Stenberg struck down the statute, finding that the legislation was 
unconstitutional both because it lacked a health exception and because it 
unduly burdened the abortion right due to its effective proscription of most 
second- and third-trimester abortion procedures.30  In Carhart, the Court 
was asked to consider a revised version of the statute at issue in Stenberg, 
which included language that defined the criminalized procedure to a 
greater level of specificity than its Stenberg predecessor.31 
Carhart held that the statute was constitutional—finding that it 
"further[ed] the legitimate interest of the Government in protecting the life 
of the fetus that may become a child."32  Moreover, the Court found that the 
criminalization of this specific type of abortion procedure did not unduly 
burden a woman’s abortion right because the proscription "expresses 
                                                                                                                 
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 ed., Supp. IV)).  Nonintact, or standard, D&E procedures 
differ from the intact D&E insofar as the physician does not attempt to extract the fetus 
intact from the uterus, instead, the physician dismembers the fetus and removes it from the 
woman’s body in parts.  See id. at 135–36 (describing the nonintact, or standard, D&E 
procedure). 
 29. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 914, 945–46 (finding a similar Nebraska abortion statute 
unconstitutional). 
 30. Id. at 938, 945–46 (finding the statute unconstitutional for these reasons).  
 31. The Nebraska statute defined a partial-birth abortion as:  
[A]n abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially 
delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and 
completing the delivery.  For purposes of this subdivision, the term partially 
delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child means 
deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or 
a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the 
person performing such procedure knows will kill the unborn child and does kill 
the unborn child. 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326 (1998). 
 32. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 146.  Against the charge that the statute was void for 
vagueness, the Court responded that the language in the federal Act, unlike the Nebraska 
statute, clearly "define[d] the line between potentially criminal conduct on the one hand and 
lawful abortion on the other."  Id. at 149.  Moreover, the Court found that the scienter 
requirement, providing that a physician must intend to perform an intact D&E procedure, 
"alleviate[d] vagueness concerns."  Id.  The Court also held that although the statute did not 
contain a health exception, it survived constitutional scrutiny because "[t]he medical 
uncertainty over whether the Act’s prohibition creates significant health risks provides a 
sufficient basis to conclude in this facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue 
burden."  Id. at 164. 
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respect for the dignity of human life"33—a goal that, per Casey,34 the state 
can pursue, although the state’s pursuit of the goal may, directly or 
tangentially, burden the abortion right.35 
In the process of upholding the federal PBA, the Court made the claim 
for which the Carhart decision is probably most identified:  abortion harms 
women.36  However, this argument is part of a more elaborate conceptual 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 157 
 34. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (noting that 
abortion regulations that allow the state to "express profound respect for the life of the 
unborn are permitted"). 
 35. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (authorizing the state to pursue 
the goal of promoting respect for the dignity of human life). 
Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the 
State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and substitute 
others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical 
profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn. 
Id. 
 36. See id. at 159 (arguing that "[s]evere depression and loss of esteem can follow" an 
abortion); see also Rebecca E. Ivey, Destabilizing Discourses: Blocking and Exploiting a 
New Discourse at Work in Gonzales v. Carhart, 94 VA. L. REV. 1451, 1455 (2008) (noting 
that the "woman-protective discourse, which arises in nascent form in the Stenberg 
dissents . . . reaches its full expression in Gonzales"); Martha K. Plante, "Protecting" 
Women’s Health:  How Gonzales v. Carhart Endangers Women’s Health and Women’s 
Equal Right to Personhood Under the Constitution, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
389, 400 (2007) (arguing that "the Court mocked the role that a woman’s mental health plays 
in the abortion decision, implying that women are not competent to make such serious 
decisions and must be saved from themselves by the state and the courts"); Harper Jean 
Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion:  Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal 
Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 121 (2008) (noting that Justice Kennedy looked 
to an "amicus brief describing the discredited ‘post-abortion syndrome’" for support of the 
claim that "abortion . . . by its nature [is] harmful to women"); Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. 
Carhart and the Court’s "Women’s Regret" Rationale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) 
(arguing that Justice "Kennedy, assuming facts not in evidence, gave to abortion-rights 
opponents something they have sought for a number of years—official recognition of the 
women’s regret rationale").  Siegel offers an engaging genealogy of the abortion-harms-
women argument, which she calls "woman-protective abortion argument"—describing its 
origins as a therapeutic discourse designed to discourage women from terminating their 
immediate pregnancies and tracing its transformation into a legal and political argument 
made by anti-abortion social movements that was ultimately accepted by the majority in 
Carhart.  See Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 23, at 1643–51 (describing the 
evolution of the abortion-harms-women argument).  Indeed, Siegel’s academic interest in the 
abortion-harms-women argument predated the Court’s decision in Carhart.  In earlier 
scholarship, she argued that abortion regulations that were premised on the belief that 
abortion harms women violate equal protection guarantees contained in the Constitution.  
See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion:  An Equality Analysis of Women-
Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 993 (2007) (analyzing "the 
state’s claimed interest in protecting women from abortion" showing "that these 
justifications rest on gender stereotypes about women’s capacity and women’s roles," and 
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apparatus that begins with the logic that Congress advanced in justification 
of the federal PBA.37  The next section starts the analysis there. 
A.  The Fetus-qua-Infant and How "Abortion Harms Women" 
In the course of arguing that the state may constitutionally burden the 
abortion right with laws that express "profound respect" for fetal life, 
Carhart approvingly cites Congressional Findings surrounding the federal 
PBA, documenting Congress’s concern with "‘drawing a bright line that 
clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide.’"38  The Court went on to 
"confirm the validity of drawing boundaries to prevent certain practices that 
extinguish life and are close to actions that are condemned."39  The federal 
PBA was intended to draw this boundary.  The criminalization of intact 
D&E procedures, which are, according to Congress, dangerously mimetic 
of infanticide in a way that nonintact D&E procedures are not, is advanced 
as a proper exercise of a state engaged in "promot[ing] respect for life, 
including the life of the unborn."40 
In order to find the federal PBA constitutional, the Carhart majority 
had to legitimate the boundaries drawn by Congress, reasoning that the 
lawfulness of an abortion procedure ought to be achieved by its distance 
from infanticide.41  The majority’s task is to support a logic wherein the 
differences between intact and nonintact D&E procedures acquire 
constitutional significance—wherein one procedure approximates 
infanticide so closely that its proscription remains constitutional, while the 
other has such sufficient distance from infanticide that it is legitimately 
untouched by the proscription of its sibling procedure.42  To accomplish this 
                                                                                                                 
concluding that "[e]nacting a law to compel a pregnant woman to become a mother for these 
reasons violates the Equal Protection Clause"). 
 37. See infra Part II.A (discussing Congress’s justification for the PBA). 
 38. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 157. 
 41. See id. at 158 ("The Court has in the past confirmed the validity of drawing 
boundaries to prevent certain practices that extinguish life and are close to actions that are 
condemned.").  
 42. Other scholars have noted the novelty that characterizes the Carhart majority’s 
attempt to find constitutional significance in the differences between intact D&E produces 
and nonintact D&E procedures.  One scholar has written that "the Court’s willingness to 
draw sharp lines between procedures on the grounds of vague and unbounded concerns 
about ‘coarsening society’ represents a novel lens through which to analyze reproductive 
rights."  Sonia M. Suter, The "Repugnance" Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories 
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task, the Court had to accept Congress’s reasoning that the abortion 
procedure is more like infanticide the closer the aborted fetus, or abortus, 
resembles an infant when it is removed from the uterus.43   Conversely, the 
less the abortus approximates an infant upon its removal from the woman’s 
body, the greater the distance the procedure has from infanticide.  Within 
the legislature’s logic, infanticide is inflicted on infants assuming a human 
form; abortions are inflicted on fetuses not assuming a human form.  When 
a physician purports to perform an abortion procedure on an object that 
assumes the human form, the bright line between infanticide and abortion is 
transgressed, and the state may legitimately proscribe the "abortion" 
procedure.44 
Yet, the conceptual apparatus erected by Congress in the federal PBA 
and legitimated by the Court in Carhart proceeds from a problematic 
assumption—that is, that the fetus is appropriately likened to an infant.  To 
begin, there is no fundamental justification for attaching legal significance 
to the form that the abortus assumes upon its removal from the woman’s 
body.  When one takes as one’s point of reference the form the fetus 
                                                                                                                 
of Reproductive Rights:  Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1514, 1568 (2008). She notes that this lens, a "repugnance lens," may be used to 
justify severe limitations on reproductive rights.  Id. 
 43. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) ("Congress determined that the 
abortion methods it proscribed had a ‘disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn 
infant,’ and thus it . . . clearly distinguishe[d] abortion and infanticide." (citations omitted)).  
 44. There also seems to be other boundaries that are transgressed in the performance 
of the intact D&E procedure—at least within the conceptual apparatus constructed by 
Congress and affirmed by the Court.  It would appear that, for Congress and the Carhart 
majority, there are obstetricians and there are abortionists.  Obstetricians deliver infants 
during the process of a live birth; abortionists conduct abortions during abortion processes.  
In pulling the body of the fetus into the vagina via breech extraction in the course of the 
intact D&E, the abortionist acts as would an "obstetrician delivering a child."  Stenberg v. 
Carhart¸ 530 U.S. 914, 959 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  However, subsequent to the 
breech extraction, which is properly performed pursuant to a live birth, the physician 
aspirates the contents of the fetus’s brain and performs an abortion.  In this way, the intact 
D&E procedure transgresses the demarcations between live birth and abortion processes by 
using the process of a live birth to conduct an abortion.  As Justice Kennedy wrote in his 
dissent in Stenberg, "We are referred to substantial medical authority that [the intact D&E] 
perverts the natural birth process to a greater degree than [nonintact] D&E, commandeering 
the live birth process until the skull is pierced."  Id. at 962–63.  He approvingly cites an 
amicus curiae brief, which argued that the intact D&E procedure "is aberrant and troubling 
because the technique confuses the disparate role of a physician in childbirth and abortion."  
Id. at 963.  After noting that the intact D&E procedure requires doctors to use "the natural 
delivery process to kill the fetus," he concludes that the State was justified in proscribing the 
procedure, as "the natural birth process has been appropriated."  Id. at 964; see also Carhart, 
550 U.S. at 160 (arguing that the intact D&E "perverts a process during which life is brought 
into the world"). 
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assumes in utero, the object of the intact D&E procedure is identical to the 
object of the nonintact D&E procedure.  When the intact fetus being 
sustained by the woman is the referent, one can appreciate that the intact 
D&E procedure is no more and no less like infanticide than nonintact 
D&Es.45  If one chooses to liken an in utero fetus to an infant, one can 
appreciate that infanticide of this fetus-cum-infant may be accomplished by 
                                                                                                                 
 45. The Court in Stenberg specifically made this point, arguing that "the notion that 
either of these two equally gruesome procedures . . . is more akin to infanticide than the 
other, or that the State furthers any legitimate interest by banning one but not the other, is 
simply irrational."  Stenberg¸ 530 U.S. at 946–47.  
It is interesting that the Court in Carhart did not consider the form that the fetus 
assumes within the woman.  From one angle, one could understand the Court’s refusal to 
consider the fetus in utero as a rejection of visual technologies, which tend to disregard the 
fact that the visualized, free-floating, seemingly autonomous fetus is being sustained by a 
woman.  These technologies have been roundly criticized by feminists and other scholars.  
Rosalind Petchetsky makes this argument cogently:   
The fetus in utero has become a metaphor for "man" in space, floating free, 
attached only by the umbilical cord to the spaceship.  But where is the mother in 
that metaphor?  She has become empty space. . . .  [T]he autonomous, free-
floating foetus merely extends to gestation the Hobbesian view of born human 
beings as disconnected, solitary individuals.  [This] abstract individualism . . . 
efface[es] the pregnant woman and the foetus’ dependence on her. . . . 
Rosalind Petchetsky, Foetal Images:  The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of 
Reproduction, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD, AND MEDICINE 57, 
63 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987). 
Insofar as the Court appears to reject the assumption of the perspective allowed by 
these technologies, one could argue that the Court is assuming a feminist or woman-centered 
position.  However, from another angle, one could understand the Court’s refusal to consider 
the fetus in utero as its acquisition of the perspective of the (likely gendered male) physician 
who sees the abortus when it is removed from the woman.  That is, it is the physician 
performing the abortion who sees the form that the object of the procedure assumes. 
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy proclaims to reject this perspective in his dissent in 
Stenberg.  Chastising the majority for using medical terminology—such as "transcervical 
procedures," "osmotic dilators," "instrumental disarticulation," and "paracervical block"—to 
describe the procedure at issue, Kennedy writes that "the majority views the procedure from 
the perspective of the abortionist."  Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  In 
Stenberg, Justice Kennedy argues that the majority should assume "the perspective of the 
society shocked when confronted with a new method of ending human life."  Id. at 957; see 
also id. at 962 (noting that "abortion is fraught with consequences for . . . the persons who 
perform and assist in the procedure [and for] society which must confront the knowledge 
that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence 
against innocent human life"); cf. Ivey, supra note 36, at 1461 (reading Justice Kennedy’s 
account of the intact D&E abortion procedure in Carhart as assuming the perspective of the 
medical personnel, who "can see and thus internalize" the event).  Accordingly, in placing 
primacy on the form of the ex utero fetus assumes over the in utero fetus, it would appear 
that Carhart has indeed acquired the perspective of the observing society, which may react 
in horror to the form that the abortus assumes.  Notably, the woman, whose body once 
sustained the abortus, is also not explicitly included in this perspective. 
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decapitation or the piercing of the infant’s skull (which occurs during the 
intact D&E procedure), just as it may be accomplished by dismemberment 
(which occurs during the nonintact D&E procedure).46  Differently stated, 
the proximity to infanticide need not turn on the form the fetus assumes 
after the procedure; it may just as well turn on the form the fetus assumes 
before the procedure.  If the latter is the point of reference, intact and 
nonintact D&Es are indistinguishable in their approximation to infanticide. 
Now, of course, the goal here is not to argue that Congress somehow 
erred when it failed to also criminalize nonintact D&E procedures.  Instead, 
the point is that it is arbitrary to select the post-abortion fetus as the referent 
for determining a procedure’s approximation to infanticide.47  Furthermore, 
and more problematically, the Court’s acceptance of the conceptual 
apparatus posited by Congress obscures that, in order for any abortion 
procedure to approximate infanticide, the fetus must first be likened to an 
infant.  That the Court does not question whether Congress may 
legitimately liken the fetus to an infant intimates towards a conclusion that I 
will elaborate later:  the Court is proceeding from the assumption that it 
knows the moral status of the fetus and, further, that this moral status is one 
of a value-possessing "life."48 
Yet, the Court expands upon the conceptual apparatus offered by 
Congress by inserting it into a larger ontology of motherhood; moreover, 
this is a metaphysics of motherhood that leads the Court to assert that 
abortion harms women.  To explain:  after a relatively unexceptional (if 
provocative, insofar as it included graphic descriptions of the abortion 
procedure at issue) discussion of the potential vagueness, overbreadth, and 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing the nonintact D&E 
procedure). 
 47. The Carhart dissent similarly recognized the arbitrariness of the Court’s decision.  
Justice Ginsburg, writing for Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, argued: 
Delivery of an intact . . . fetus warrants special condemnation, the Court 
maintains, because a fetus that is not dismembered resembles an infant.  But so, 
too, does a fetus delivered intact after it is terminated by injection a day or two 
before the surgical evacuation, or a fetus delivered through medical induction or 
cesarean.  Yet, the availability of those procedures—along with D&E by 
dismemberment—the Court says, saves the ban on intact D&E from a 
declaration of unconstitutionality. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  As indicated by the dissent, the 
majority’s logic contains contradictions and inconsistencies; after Carhart, constitutional 
protection will still be afforded to abortion procedures that produce aborted fetuses that 
resemble infants (subsequent to digoxin-preceded intact D&E procedures as well as 
abortions performed through medical inductions and cesareans). 
 48. See infra Part II.B (unpacking the meaning of a "value-possessing ‘life’").  
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unduly burdensomeness of the federal PBA, Carhart takes a jarring, almost 
inexplicable turn49 when it proclaims, "[r]espect for human life finds an 
ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child."50  It is 
this slightly maudlin, highly disputable,51 yet effectively vapid statement 
that is the springboard for the Court’s elaboration of its ontology of life, 
motherhood, and abortion.52   
As discussed above, the Court accepts Congress’s reasoning that the 
abortion procedure is more disrespectful of human life the closer the object 
of the procedure resembles a child; accordingly, the intact D&E procedure, 
with its infant-like abortus, may be criminalized because of the high level 
of disrespect it shows for human life.53  Yet, the Court introduces its 
discussion of the issue with avowals of the "bond of love the mother has for 
her child" as the "ultimate expression" of "respect for human life." 
It would appear that, for the Court, the more the object of the 
procedure approximates a child, the more the woman undergoing the 
abortion procedure approximates a mother, and the more disrespect is 
shown human life by the procedure that would disrupt that always already 
bond between mother and child.  Conversely, the less the object of the 
procedure approximates a child, the less the woman undergoing the 
procedure approximates a mother, and the less disrespect is shown human 
life by the procedure that would disrupt that bond.  Following this logic, 
one can then understand the significance of the Court’s conclusion that: 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Laura J. Tepich, Gonzales v. Carhart:  The Partial Termination of the Right to 
Choose, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 383 (2008) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s "lapse" into a 
reflection on the "bond of love" between mother and child is "an unconnected and 
completely unsubstantiated reflection about motherhood"). 
 50. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). 
 51. Indeed, the majority’s statement that "respect for human life finds an ultimate 
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child" might best be described not as 
disputable, but rather as inarguable.  See Turner, supra note 36, at 41 (noting that the 
Court’s opinion is based on an "inarguable premise and conclusion about abortion and 
‘women’"); cf. Tepich, supra note 49, at 383 (describing the Court’s statement that "respect 
for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child" 
as "completely without support"). 
 52. Tepich notes that "[i]t remains a mystery to this author and to countless other 
bystanders, including Justice Ginsburg, where exactly Justice Kennedy came up with these 
sweeping conclusions about the nature and moral nuances of motherhood" and describes this 
part of the majority opinion as a "moral meandering through the realm of motherhood."  
Tepich, supra note 49, at 385. 
 53. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158 ("Congress determined that the abortion methods it 
proscribed had a ‘disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn infant,’ and thus it was 
concerned with ‘drawing a bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide.’" 
(citations omitted)). 
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It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort 
must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound 
when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know:  that 
she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing 
brain on her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.54 
Within the majority’s metaphysics, when the object of the procedure 
approximates a child, the woman approximates motherhood; yet the Court’s 
citation to the "self-evident" fact that a woman will suffer more if she learns 
that her abortus resembled a child reveals that, also a part of this 
metaphysics, is the belief that the more the woman approximates 
motherhood, the more damage the procedure inflicts on her.  Conversely, 
the less the object of the procedure approximates a child, the less the 
woman approximates motherhood, and as a result, the less the damage that 
is inflicted by the abortion.55  
Again, this conceptual apparatus proceeds from the dubious 
assumption that respect for human life ought to be aligned with an abortion 
procedure that produces fragments of an infant; respect for human life 
could just as easily be aligned with the abortion procedure that produces an 
intact fetal body.56  Moreover, it is not self-evident that a woman 
approximates motherhood by the form her abortus assumes.  An alternative 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. at 159.  Turner observes that the majority states that only "some women" regret 
their decisions to abort.  Turner, supra note 36, at 41.  However, when the wholesale 
proscription of an abortion method is based on the state’s desire to protect "some women" 
from the regret that they may experience after undergoing an abortion, "the operative 
meaning of ‘some women’ is, in effect, ‘all women.’"  Id. 
Turner goes on to note that the woman’s regret rationale may be extended to justify the 
prohibition of other abortion methods—specifically, "the equally ‘brutal’ and ‘gruesome’ but 
still lawful procedure of D&E by dismemberment."  Id. at 41–42.  He writes, "Gonzales thus 
provides a judicially validated wedge for those who see and will certainly use the Court’s 
decision to extend the reach of the regret rationale beyond the intact D&E setting in their 
continuing effort to chip away at and ultimately achieve the interment of the Roe-Casey 
legal regime."  Id. at 42; see also Suter, supra note 42, at 1578 ("[I]f the goal is to protect 
women from [ ] ‘severe depression and loss of self-esteem’ . . . by not permitting her to 
choose how her fetus will be killed, why may it not protect her more securely by not 
permitting her an abortion at all?" (quoting Ronald Dworkin, The Court & Abortion: Worse 
Than You Think, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 31, 2007, at 21)). 
 55. It should be noted that, although the question for the Court is how closely the 
woman approximates motherhood, within the worldview articulated, the woman is already a 
"mother" by virtue of her pregnancy; further, she remains a "mother" without regard to the 
trajectory her pregnancy takes.  Accordingly, the woman who has successfully terminated a 
pregnancy and has come to "struggle with grief . . . and sorrow" when she learns that a 
doctor "pierce[d] the skull and vacuum[ed] the fast-developing brain of her unborn child" 
can still, rightfully, be referred to by the Court as a "mother." 
 56. This would enable the fetus to be interred, for example. 
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ontology is suggested by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, where she notes 
that "notwithstanding the ‘bond of love’ women often have with their 
children, not all pregnancies, this Court has recognized, are wanted, or even 
the product of consensual activity."57  An alternative ontology might hold 
that the form the abortus assumes is irrelevant to the woman’s status as a 
mother; what is relevant, on the contrary, is the wantedness of her 
pregnancy and her desire to be a mother.  A "mother" is not simply 
identifiable by biological fiat, but rather is an identity a woman assumes—
agentively and consciously. 
Yet, forming the condition of possibility for the Court’s acceptance of 
the fetus-as-infant analogy and its subsequent insertion into a larger 
ontology of motherhood—ultimately leading the majority to think it "self-
evident" that abortion harms women—is the Court’s confidence about the 
knowledge it possesses regarding the moral status of the fetus.  Simply put, 
the Court assumes that the fetus is a morally weighty entity—a "life" that 
deserves its utmost respect and deference. 
B.  The Question of "Life" 
Resonant in the Carhart majority opinion is a binary composed of 
"alive" and "dead,"58 a binary that speaks most directly to the argument that 
I ultimately make:  The Court assumes that it knows of the moral status of 
the fetus and this assumption unfairly overdetermines the questions that the 
Court asks with the undue burden standard.59  Within the Court’s logic, 
some things are alive; other things are dead.  There is no zone of 
indistinction between these two categories; further, there are no categories 
external to them.  Moreover, the only signifier capable of describing that 
passage from one existential category to the next is "kill"; a "live" thing 
must be "killed" in order to become a "dead" thing.  For the Carhart 
majority and the Congress that passed the federal PBA, the fetus, prior to 
the abortion procedure, is a "live" thing residing amongst the other natural 
phenomena in the "alive" category.  The dilemma, then, that the Court must 
adjudicate concerns the proper technique by which the "live" fetus in utero 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 184 n.8 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 58. See id. at 158 ("Congress determined that the abortion methods it proscribed had a 
‘disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn infant,’ and thus it was concerned with 
‘drawing a bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide.’" (citations 
omitted)). 
 59. See infra Part III (explaining this argument). 
932 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2010) 
becomes a "dead" fetus ex utero.  That is, the Court must decide whether it 
will give constitutional protection to a technique by which the fetus is 
"killed."  Blunt in its task, this is the terminology the Court uses.60 
The categories of "alive" and "dead" articulated and manipulated in the 
majority opinion in Carhart are logical consequences of a foundational 
premise—that the fetus has a morally significant "life."61  Indeed, this is the 
first announcement that the Court makes, after reciting the procedural 
posture of the case:  "The Act proscribes a particular manner of ending fetal 
life, so it is necessary here, as it was in Stenberg, to discuss abortion 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See, e.g., Carhart, 550 U.S. at 136 ("Once dead, moreover, the fetus’ body will 
soften, and its removal will be easier." (emphasis added)); id. at 138 ("Another doctor 
testified he crushes a fetus’ skull not only to reduce its size but also to ensure the fetus is 
dead before it is removed." (emphasis added)); id. at 136 ("Some doctors, especially later in 
the second trimester, may kill the fetus a day or two before performing the surgical 
evacuation." (emphasis added)); id. at 138 ("Dr. Haskell’s approach is not the only method 
of killing the fetus." (emphasis added)). 
The majority performs a fascinating rhetorical move when it cites a doctor who testified 
in the lower court concerning the method that he uses for performing intact D&E abortion 
procedures.  The Court’s quotation of the doctor is as follows:  
Yet one doctor would not allow delivery of a live fetus younger than [twenty-
four] weeks because "the objective of [his] procedure is to perform an abortion," 
not a live birth.  The doctor thus answered in the affirmative when asked 
whether he would "hold the fetus’ head on the internal side of the [cervix] in 
order to collapse the skull" and kill the fetus before it is born. 
Id. at 139.  The placement of the quotation marks in the Court’s citation of this physician’s 
testimony reveals that the physician did not describe himself as "killing" the fetus before it is 
"born."  The Court provides the text of the doctor’s testimony as he provides exacting detail 
of the abortion technique that he uses; however, the Court performs its own editorializing 
when it "finishes" the physician’s sentence.  That is, it is the voice of the majority, and not 
the physician, that describes the physician as "killing the fetus before it is born." 
One could argue that the Court’s use of terms such as "living fetus" and "kill" does not 
reflect the Court’s own worldview, but rather, indicates that the Court is merely 
ventriloquizing the statute at issue.  This is to say that it is the statute that contains a logic of 
"alive" versus "dead," with "killing" being the apt and only descriptor for the passage from 
one category to the next; moreover, it is the statute that criminalizes the behavior of a 
physician who would "kill[] a human fetus" after performing "an overt act that the person 
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus."  See id. at 142 (citing the federal Partial-
Birth Abortion Act, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1531).  However, the majority opinion does not 
merely make use of the statute’s terminology, but rather expands upon the worldview that 
the terminology presupposes—specifically in its affirmation of the federal PBA as an 
exercise of the state engaged in the legitimate practice of protecting fetal life, an affirmation 
that culminates in the unfalsifiable statement that "[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate 
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child."  Id. at 158. 
 61. See infra notes 64–74 and accompanying text (explaining the use of quotation 
marks around the word "life"). 
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procedures in some detail."62  Later in the opinion, the Court provides color 
as to how it arrived at its early-announced conclusion that the fetus has a 
life:  it proclaims, "The Act does apply to both previability and postviability 
because, by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a 
living organism while within the womb, whether or not . . . viable outside 
the womb."63 
The rhetorical trick that Justice Kennedy performs by referring to the 
fetus as a "living organism" is that it appears that he only contemplates the 
unchallenged biological fact of fetal life.  However, throughout the opinion, 
the fetal life that is spoken of is not prosaic, biological life, but rather 
morally consequential "life."  That is, the biological life that characterizes 
the "living organism" is not usually considered weighty enough to be the 
target of constitutionally protected state expressions of "profound respect"; 
plain biological life, when terminated, does not commonly suggest "grief," 
"anguish," "profound sorrow" and the expectation that "severe depression 
and loss of esteem"64 will follow; biological life at its most exemplary does 
not generally conjure up "the bond of love the mother has for her child";65 
indeed, "biological life" usually may be thought to be sustained within the 
uterus, not the "womb."66  The vocabulary and the imagery that the majority 
uses when speaking about the biological life of the fetus as a living 
organism suggests that the Court believes that morally salient "life" also 
attaches to the biological life of the fetus—that is, that the fetus is an entity 
of significant moral value. 
In seamlessly attaching "moral life" onto "biological life," the majority 
mimics the larger, cultural processes by which the two types of life are 
made simultaneous to one another.  Historian Barbara Duden tracks these 
processes in her compelling "history of life not as an object but as a 
notion"—a history that tracks the "conditions under which, in the course of 
one generation, technology along with a new discourse has transformed . . . 
the unborn into a life, and life into a supreme value."67  She notes the role 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 134. 
 63. Id. at 147.  One commentator has noted that this statement reveals that Justice 
Kennedy believes that the fetus represents not merely "potential life," but rather "life" 
unqualified.  See Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind:  Informed 
Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1615 (2008) ("This statement forms 
the first step of Justice Kennedy’s argument, establishing that after conception, life—not 
merely potential life—exists independently of fetal personhood."). 
 64. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 147. 
 67. BARBARA DUDEN, DISEMBODYING WOMEN:  PERSPECTIVES ON PREGNANCY AND THE 
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that religion has played in this conflation of moral and biological life, 
quoting then Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict, who argued that 
"right from fertilization is begun the adventure of a human life."68  While 
fertilization arguably marks the beginning of biological life, for the 
Cardinal, moral life also begins at that point.  Duden writes, "He is 
accepting a definition from the current frame of a natural science, investing 
the object so defined with moral and religious significance and attributing 
to this object the status of a person."69  Within certain philosophies, the 
appearance of the scientific fact suggests the appearance of a moral fact. 
Such philosophies have gained great currency recently.70  Indeed, the 
signifier "life" has come to signify moral life in the same moment that it 
                                                                                                                 
UNBORN 2 (1994).  
 68. Id. at 21. 
 69. Id.  The rhetorical act by which moral life is made concurrent with biological life 
is readily apparent in a fuller quote of Cardinal Ratzinger’s argumentation: 
Certainly no experimental datum can be in itself sufficient to bring us to the 
recognition of a spiritual soul; nevertheless, the conclusions of science regarding 
the human embryo provide a valuable indication for discerning by the use of 
reason a personal presence at the moment of this first appearance of a human 
life:  How could a human individual not be a human person? 
Id. 
 70. The administration of George W. Bush helped to popularize philosophies attesting 
to the simultaneity of biological life and moral life through its campaign to promote a 
"culture of life" in the U.S.—a phenomenon that Sanger tracks in her exposition on infant 
"safe haven" laws.  Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws:  Legislating in the Culture of 
Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 800–08 (2006) [hereinafter Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws].  
Sanger quotes the former President’s first usage of the phrase "culture of life" at a dedication 
of the Pope John Paul II Cultural Center: 
The culture of life is a welcoming culture, never excluding, never dividing, 
never despairing and always affirming the goodness of life in all its seasons.  In 
the culture of life, we must make room for the stranger.  We must comfort the 
sick.  We must care for the aged.  We must welcome the immigrant.  We must 
teach our children to be gentle with one another.  We must defend in love the 
innocent child waiting to be born. 
Id. at 802.  As indicated by the figure of the "innocent child waiting to be born," the 
supremely valuable "life" about which the "culture of life" was concerned and which merited 
protection began at conception—upon the advent of biological life.  Writes Sanger, "‘Life’ 
now refers to unborn life, no longer from the moment of quickening or from the point of 
viability, but from the first instant of fertilization . . . .  [T]he culture of life only appears to 
have liberated the meaning of ‘life,’ as the word has actually become synonymous with 
‘unborn life.’"  Id. at 806.  Moreover, the "life" protected by the "culture of life" continued, 
unchanged, until death.  Accordingly, the stem cell, the fetus, and the brain dead—alongside 
the stranger, the sick, the aged, and the immigrant—were all in possession of the "life" that 
would be embraced by the "culture of life"  Id. at 803–04.  As the phrase "the culture of life" 
began to appear in the official Republican Party Platform, several presidential 
proclamations, the 2005 State of the Union Address, and several Senate resolutions, the 
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signifies biological life:  "[T]he term life (and a life) has become an idol, 
and controversy has attached a halo to this idol that precludes its 
dispassionate use in ordinary discourse."71  And again, more expansively: 
Life itself is not an amoeba word, since it does not have any application 
as a technical term in scientific discourse.  Unlike zygote and fetus, it 
does not stem from the language of a disciplinary thought collective.  
And yet it acquires motivating and emotional power from being used by 
experts, not only because they use it with pathos but because they claim 
special competence in understanding its meaning.  Therefore, the 
semantic trap into which the use of "a life" leads is not due primarily to 
its ambiguity but to its vapidity.72 
It seems that the Carhart majority is not adjudicating the question of 
the constitutional protection that ought to be afforded to certain 
techniques of ending fetal biological life; rather, the majority is 
adjudicating the question of whether to afford constitutional protection to 
a procedure that "ends" the morally weighty, pathos-invoking, 
emotionally consequential "life" of the fetus.73  By accepting fetal "life" as 
the object of the intact D&E procedure, the Court has taken a moral 
position regarding the status of the fetus.74  It is a moral position, 
                                                                                                                 
particular philosophy of "life" that it presupposed gained currency.  Id. at 803. 
 71. DUDEN, supra note 67, at 2. 
 72. Id. at 75; see also Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights:  Whether and How Roe 
Should be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 406 (1992) [hereinafter, Dworkin, 
Unenumerated Rights] (describing abortion opponents’ views about the wrong occasioned 
by abortion in a manner similar to Duden’s description of "life"). Dworkin writes that 
opponents "assume that human life is intrinsically valuable, and worthy of a kind of awe, 
just because it is human life.  Id.  They think that once a human life begins, it is a very bad 
thing—a kind of sacrilege—that it end prematurely . . . ."  Id.  He writes about this "life" as 
"sacrosanct" and depicts it as possessing an "inherent value"; indeed, when this "life" is 
destroyed, it is tantamount to having committed a taboo.  Id. at 406–07. 
 73. The majority’s premise that the fetus has a (morally cognizable) "life," which 
exceeds its status as a "living organism," likely explains the majority’s insistence upon 
referring to the fetus’s "body"—even when citing physicians who, presumably proficient in 
the "scientific terminology" referenced approvingly by the majority earlier in its opinion, 
refer to fetal "tissue," and not fetal "bodies."  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 137 
(2007).  For example, the majority cited a doctor who testified in the lower court as saying 
that "[i]f I know I have good dilation . . . and I think I can accomplish . . . the abortion with 
an intact delivery, then . . . I don’t close [my forceps] quite so much, and I just gently draw 
the tissue out attempting to have an intact delivery, if possible." Id. (emphasis added). 
 74. It would be incorrect to argue that the view that moral life is simultaneous to 
biological life is necessarily a religious position, although many well-respected jurists and 
scholars have made such an argument.  See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 
490, 565–67 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the belief that "life" begins at 
conception necessarily has a "theological basis" and that laws that distinguish between 
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abortion and contraception are invalid under the First Amendment because they could serve 
"no identifiable secular purpose"); LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION:  A CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 
116 (1990) [hereinafter TRIBE, ABORTION] (stating that "beliefs about the point at which 
human life begins" have a "theological source"); Laurence H. Tribe, Forward:  Toward a 
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1973) 
[hereinafter, Tribe, Forward] ("[A]t this point in the history of industrialized Western 
civilization, that decision [to choose conception as the point at which human life begins] 
entails not an inference from generally shared premises, whether factual or moral, but a 
statement of religious faith."); Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 72, at 155 ("We 
may describe most people’s beliefs about the inherent value of human life—beliefs deployed 
in their opinions about abortion—as essentially religious beliefs."); id. at 158 ("Procreative 
decisions are fundamental in a different way; the moral issues on which they hinge are 
religious in the broad sense . . . , touching the ultimate purpose and value of human life 
itself."). 
Dworkin even goes so far as to found the right to abortion in the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of freedom of religion.  See id. at 165 ("[A]ny government that prohibits abortion 
commits itself to a controversial interpretation of the sanctity of life and therefore limits 
liberty by commanding one essentially religious position over others, which the First 
Amendment forbids."); see also Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional 
Command?, 70 IND. L.J. 331, 340 (1995) (contending that all "moral regulations are 
essentially religious in nature"). 
Professor Tribe remains ambivalent on the point of the simultaneity of moral positions 
and religious positions regarding the fetus, however.  He appears willing to concede the 
"theological source" of beliefs concerning the advent of morally significant "life," yet is 
unwilling to argue that the religiosity of these beliefs dictate that the government, pursuant 
to principles regarding the separation of church and state, stay uninvolved in the dispute.  He 
writes that, "as a matter of constitutional law, a question such as this, having an irreducibly 
moral dimension, cannot properly be kept out of the political realm merely because many 
religions and organized religious groups inevitably take strong positions on it."  TRIBE, 
ABORTION, supra note 74, at 116.  He concludes that "the arguments of pro-choice advocates 
about the religious nature of attempts to define the beginning of a person’s existence as a 
separate human being really don’t answer the question of whether or not abortion must be 
left to unfettered personal choice."  Id. 
Nevertheless, I assume that the position that the Court has taken regarding the fetus is 
an entirely moral position—as opposed to a religious or theological position.  But see 
Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 72, at 414 ("[B]eliefs about the intrinsic 
importance of human life are distinguished from more secular convictions about morality, 
fairness, and justice.").  Moreover, I assume that, although this position may be informed by 
religion or theology, it remains capable of being described, at the end of the day, as a moral 
position.  Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
352, 379 (1985) (discussing the "moral status" of the fetus).  Greenawalt argues that:  
If the moral status of the fetus and desirable legal policy are not resolvable on 
rational grounds, individuals must decide these questions on some nonrational 
basis.  For many persons, the basis for judgment is supplied in whole or part by 
religious perspectives, which either indicate the fetus’ moral status or gravely 
influence one’s mode of thinking about it.  
Id.; see also Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws, supra note 70, at 807 (stating that although the 
"life" referenced in the "culture of life" "sounds secular enough, its rhetorical value is much 
enhanced by its association with Christianity" and noting that "[t]he phrase comes straight 
from the Vatican").  Accordingly, while I find attractive Dworkin’s argument that beliefs 
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furthermore, that is highly debated; the truth of the position has not been 
decided.75  However, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, purports 
to have decided this question, and he allows that knowledge to be his 
guide.76 
Moreover, the majority’s assertion that, "by common understanding 
and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the 
womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb"77 unsettles some of the 
                                                                                                                 
about the fetus are "essentially religious" in nature and, consequently, that the right to an 
abortion might be locatable in the First Amendment’s provision of religious freedom, I do 
not accept that argument here.  Instead, I will assume that the belief that the fetus is/has a 
"life" and, as a cause or an effect of this "life," is a morally significant entity can be a wholly 
moral, nonreligious, position; as a result, I do not argue that the majority’s opinion in 
Carhart implicates the First Amendment at all. 
 75. See Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 72, at 408 ("The sanctity of life 
is . . . a highly contestable value."). 
I do not attempt to answer the question of what new knowledge will need to be acquired 
before the moral status of the fetus, and at what point "life" begins, can be decided.  Cf. 
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 799–800 (1986) 
(White, J., dissenting) (noting that the informed consent provisions that were struck down as 
unconstitutional in Akron required physicians to tell their patients seeking abortions that life 
begins at conception and, consequently, "to advance tendentious statements concerning the 
unanswerable question of when human life begins" (emphasis added)).  Greenawalt has 
argued that science cannot answer these important questions for us.  See Greenawalt, supra 
note 74, at 374 (contending that science cannot resolve the moral status of the fetus and 
noting that "neither factual knowledge nor technology can establish how much consideration 
the fetus deserves").  However, perhaps future scientific and nonscientific discoveries will 
bring additional information to the debate surrounding the fetus’s moral status—allowing for 
a larger moral consensus to build around the fetus and enabling a "rational secular morality 
to resolve public policy about abortion."  Id. at 372.  Nevertheless, it remains true that, at 
present, no such moral consensus—nor moral majority, nor moral preponderance—has been 
built around the fetus. 
 76. Commentators have pointed out that the Justice Kennedy, as well as the others 
who signed on to his majority opinion in Carhart, is an avowed Catholic.  See Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Our Faith-Based Justices, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 2007, at 19 ("[T]hat all of the Catholic 
justices voted as they did in Gonzales might have nothing to do with their personal religious 
beliefs.  But given the nature of the issue, the strength of the relevant precedent, and the 
inadequacy of the court’s reasoning, the question is too obvious to ignore."); Turner, supra 
note 36, at 3 ("All five justices in the majority in Gonzales are Roman Catholic.  The four 
justices who are not all followed clear and settled precedent.").  This observation buttresses 
the argument that the beliefs about the fetus—that the fetus is "life"—that guided the 
majority are inherently religious in nature.  However, such a conclusion need not follow; the 
fact that all of the Justices in the Carhart majority are Catholic could be nothing more than 
mere coincidence.  See John Yoo, Partial-Birth Bigotry, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2007, at A8 
("[N]o one thinks religious belief explains the views of the dissenting justices.  Justices 
Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, it seems, are Jewish, while Justices John Paul 
Stevens and David Souter presumably are Protestants."). 
 77. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 147. 
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presumptions underlying the markers employed in abortion jurisprudence.  
Essentially, the Court argues that, as a living organism, the previable fetus 
has/is as much of a "life" as the postviable fetus.  This description of all 
fetuses as "alive", as opposed to some other ontological category of 
existence, should be interrogated for how it disquiets the tests formulated in 
abortion jurisprudence—tests that the Carhart majority must ultimately 
deploy, if it is not to overturn sub silentio Casey and the standards that it 
pronounced.78 
To begin, the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence since Casey has 
rested on the bright line that separates the category of viable fetuses from 
nonviable fetuses.79  Most fundamentally, nonviable fetuses may be the 
objects of a legal abortion.80  Viable fetuses, however, may not always be 
so; they have interests that—in concert with the state’s interest in the 
potential of viable fetuses to become infants—trump the needs, wants, and 
desires (but not the health or life) of the women who carry them.81  The 
distinction that separates the viable from the nonviable fetus is patently 
significant:  From the perspective of the pregnant woman and the doctor 
who would perform an abortion for her, it distinguishes those abortions that 
may be procured within the letter of the law from those that may only be 
obtained only under the possibility of criminal sanction.  Carhart rehearses 
the magnitude of the boundary separating viable and nonviable fetuses 
through its citation of Casey: 
First is the recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an 
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 874 (1992) 
(upholding a woman’s right to an abortion and creating the undue burden standard to protect 
that right). 
 79. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 939 (2000) (holding that a Nebraska 
regulation was unconstitutional because it unduly burdened the right to choose to have an 
abortion before viability); see also Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. 
Supp. 2d 957, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 
which imposed penalties on "physician[s] who . . . perform[ ] a partial-birth abortion," 
unconstitutionally posed an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose partially because the 
Act did not distinguish between previability and postviability).   
 80. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156 (stating that "the Act, as we have interpreted it, 
would be unconstitutional ‘if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability’" (quoting Casey, 505 
U.S. at 878)). 
 81. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 ("[S]ubsequent to the viability, the state in promoting 
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe 
abortion except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother."). 
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from the State.  Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong 
enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a 
substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the 
procedure.  Second is a confirmation of the State’s power to restrict 
abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for 
pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health.  And third is the 
principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the 
pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus 
that may become a child.82 
The question in Carhart was whether the criminalization of one 
technique for performing abortions unduly burdened the abortion right for 
the woman carrying a previable fetus, and whether the lack of health 
exception in the law made it constitutionally infirm as it relates to all 
abortions, both previability and postviability.  The significance of the 
"viability" marker, and that the Court might have struck down the law as a 
substantial obstacle to previability abortions without regard to its lack of 
health exception, is a holdover from Roe, where the Court held that the 
"State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life" reaches the 
"compelling" point at viability.83  Because there is a compelling state 
interest in "fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion 
during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health 
of the mother."84  However, prior to viability, there is presumably no 
compelling interest in "fetal life"; accordingly the state may not 
substantially limit a woman’s ability to terminate her pregnancy during that 
time. 
The question then becomes: why viability?  Why did Justice 
Blackmun, writing for the Roe majority, find that viability marked the point 
where the state’s important and legitimate interest in "potential life" 
sufficiently matured, became compelling, and justified the possible 
proscription of abortion altogether?  I offer the following as explanation:  
For Justice Blackmun, viability makes sense as a site at which to make 
distinctions between legitimate interests and compelling interests—as a site 
before which to allow abortions and after which to ban abortions—because 
he takes seriously the distinction that he draws between "potential life" and 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 145 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846). 
 83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54, 163–64 (1973) (holding that a woman has a 
right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, but that a State may regulate areas 
protected by this right in the interests of safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, 
and protecting potential life). 
 84. Id.  
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unqualified "life."85  Note that when Blackmun announces one of the 
fundamental holdings of the decision, he refers to previable fetuses as in 
possession of "potential life" and postviable fetuses as in possession of a, 
without qualifications, "life."86  Viability, then, is the point at which the 
potential life of the fetus emerges as a life, thereby affording the fetus a 
whole or quasi-whole membership within the human community—and 
thereby making it a legitimate target for regulations designed to protect it.87 
If we accept the above reasoning as justification for assigning 
constitutional significance to viability, then one understands as highly 
significant Justice Kennedy’s casual assertion in Carhart that the "fetus is a 
living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside 
the womb," as well as his relatively cavalier description of the pre- and 
post-viability abortion procedures at issue as concerning "a particular 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Justice Blackmun suggests as much when, arguing in dissent sixteen years later, he 
defends Roe: 
The viability link reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal development; it 
marks that threshold moment prior to which a fetus cannot survive separate from 
the woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of 
rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman.  
At the same time, the viability standard takes account of the undeniable fact that 
as the fetus evolves into its postnatal form, and as it loses its dependence on the 
uterine environment, the State’s interest in the fetus’ potential human life, and in 
fostering a regard for human life in general, becomes compelling. 
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 553 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 86. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 ("With respect to the State’s . . . interest in potential life, 
the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.  This is so because the fetus then presumably has the 
capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.  State regulation protective of fetal 
life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications."). 
 87. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The viability line 
reflects the biological . . . fetal development; it marks that threshold moment prior to which a 
fetus cannot survive separate from the woman and cannot . . . be regarded as a subject of 
rights or interests distinct from . . . those of the pregnant woman.").  However, Laurence 
Tribe reaches a different conclusion about why Justice Blackmun chose viability as the point 
at which to allow for the proscription of abortion.  Writing shortly after the decision in Roe, 
Tribe wrote that Justice Blackmun did not choose viability "because of some illusion that 
this biologically arbitrary point signals ‘any morally significant change in the developing 
human’ and certainly not because of any . . . notion that the fetus is intrinsically a human 
being from that technology-dependent point forward . . . ."  Tribe, Forward, supra note 74, 
at 27.  I disagree.  Justice Blackmun’s careful usage of "potential life" and "life" suggests 
that he believes that the previable fetus (signified by "potential life") does not possess the 
same moral significance as the postviable fetus (signified by "life"); accordingly, the 
"biologically arbitrary" point of viability would absolutely signal a "morally significant 
change in the developing human."  See Webster, 492 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the issue).  
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manner of ending fetal life."88  With these simple pronouncements, the 
majority asserts the insignificance of viability as a site distinguishing 
potential life from unqualified life.  With this pronouncement, Carhart 
makes the "bright line" of viability no more than an arbitrary moment, a 
moment among moments, within the continuous, always already "life" of 
the fetus.  As such, Carhart can be read to eliminate the significance of 
viability as a marker, and therefore eliminate the significance of the 
distinction between the pre-viable and post-viable stages of pregnancy.89  
What follows from the evanescence of the distinction between pre- and 
post-viable stages of pregnancy and the differing levels of gravity that have 
been attributed to them is that the justification for curbing the ability of the 
state to proscribe abortions outright during pre-viability is also eliminated.  
As such, Carhart opens the way for the outright proscription of all 
abortions, as what is now at stake is already and always "life."90 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 134, 147 (2007).  
 89. Justice Kennedy argues in favor of diminishing the significance of viability in his 
dissent in Stenberg, noting that the state has an interest in promoting "the dignity and value 
of human life, even life which cannot survive without the assistance of others."  Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 962 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Indeed, perhaps the most 
paradigmatic form of human life that cannot survive without the assistance of others is the 
previable fetus.  
 90. This is not a new argument; indeed, since Roe was decided in 1973, those Justices 
who believe that there ought not to be a Constitutionally protected right to an abortion had 
made variations of the claim that viability is an arbitrary point at which the state’s interest in 
fetal life becomes compelling and, accordingly, that the trimester framework did not 
properly respect that interest.  See, e.g., Webster, 492 U.S. at 519 ("[W]e do not see why the 
State’s interest in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the 
point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation 
[only] after viability."); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
746, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("The State’s interest is in the fetus as an entity in 
itself, and the character of this entity does not change at the point of viability under 
conventional medical wisdom. . . .  [T]he State’s interest, if compelling after viability, is 
equally compelling before viability."); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 
416, 459 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that Roe recognized the State interest in 
protecting the fetal life, but that "the point at which these interests become compelling does 
not depend on the trimester of pregnancy," rather that "these interests are present throughout 
pregnancy"); id. at 461 ("[P]otential life is no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy 
than it is at viability or afterward . . . .  [Choosing] viability as the point . . . the state interest 
in potential life becomes compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any point before 
viability or . . . afterward.").  
Well before Casey replaced the trimester framework with the undue burden standard, 
and well before it was demonstrated that any standard that presupposes the continuous "life" 
of the fetus is incapable of adequately protecting a woman’s abortion right, Justice 
Blackmun presciently predicted such an outcome.  In his scathing dissent in Webster, which 
upheld various regulations that increased the cost of an abortion and functioned to limit its 
availability, Justice Blackmun noted that when fetal "life" is imagined as existing, 
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Interestingly, the majority opinion in Carhart contains a fascinating 
moment in which the Court is presented with evidence—coming, ironically, 
from a proponent of the abortion right—that viability may not be as bright 
of a line as Justice Blackmun had hoped it would be when he wrote the 
majority opinion in Roe; however, the Carhart majority, clearly 
sympathetic to the position that viability is an arbitrary occasion during the 
always already significant "life" of the fetus, disregards this evidence and 
proceeds with conceptualizing viability as a definite, if not definitive, 
moment in fetal life.  To explain:  The categories of viability and 
nonviability do a lot of work within abortion jurisprudence.  One can argue 
that at least part of the reason why they were offered up to do this work was 
because they were thought not to be subject to interpretation:  Fetuses are 
either viable, or they are not.91  But, the Carhart Court had been presented 
                                                                                                                 
unchanged, from fertilization until birth, the state is justified in restricting abortions at any 
point during a woman’s pregnancy.  See Webster, 492 U.S. at 555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
("Since, in the plurality’s view, the State’s interest in potential life is compelling as of the 
moment of conception, . . . every hindrance to a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion must 
be ‘permissible.’").  Because he believed the Court to be taking a turn towards an 
understanding of "life" that began at conception, and because he likely understood the 
consequences of building an abortion jurisprudence around such a notion of "life," 
Blackmun concluded his opinion pessimistically:  "For today, at least, the law of abortion 
stands undisturbed.  For today, the women of this Nation still remain at liberty to control 
their destinies.  But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows."  Id. at 
560. 
 91. This is not to deny that the Court has recognized that scientific innovation allows 
for some movement of the line at which fetal viability will be drawn.  See Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) ("We have seen how . . . advances 
in neonatal care have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier [in pregnancy]."); 
Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) ("As medical science becomes better able 
to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back 
toward conception.").  While the Court has acknowledged that medical technology may 
affect the gestational age at which a fetus becomes viable, the question for the Court is when 
fetal viability begins, not the quantity of viability present in the fetus.  For the Court, science 
determines when viability occurs for the fetus, not how much viability a fetus has.  However, 
the physician that the Carhart majority quotes suggests that it may be equally reasonable to 
think of viability not as a binary, but rather as a spectrum or zone.  See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 
140 (quoting the physician as saying that he sometimes removes from a woman’s body a 
fetus that has "‘some viability to it, some movement of limbs’"). 
Webster, which upheld a Missouri regulation that required that physicians test fetuses 
for viability before performing an abortion on a woman more than twenty weeks pregnant, 
supports the claim that the Court is interested in determining whether or not a fetus is viable, 
as opposed to how much viability a fetus has.  See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 
U.S. 490, 519–20 (1989) (upholding the Missouri statute requiring tests for viability prior to 
obtaining an abortion). The Court interpreted the statute as establishing a presumption of 
fetal viability at twenty weeks that could be rebutted by tests establishing fetal weight and 
lung capacity.  Id. at 515.  For the Court, at issue was the question of whether a particular 
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with evidence disputing this simple dichotomy.  Quoted in the majority 
opinion is a physician who testified about the "difficult situation" in which 
he and his staff are placed when, in the course of performing an abortion, he 
removes from a woman’s body a fetus that has "’some viability to it, some 
movement of limbs.’"92  With the simple description of a fetus that has 
"some viability to it," this unnamed doctor exposes viability as a concept 
that cannot be always apprehended as dichotomous.  Viability, instead, may 
be a continuum.  Accordingly, the jurisprudential naming of viable fetuses 
as distinct from nonviable fetuses is revealed to be an act of construction.  It 
is an act of fabricating, and then stabilizing, boundaries that may be 
desirable insofar as they are helpful tools in the adjudication of 
constitutional dilemmas, yet have no privileged relationship to the material 
world.  That is, instead of merely describing the material world, these 
boundaries and the categories they produce construe the material world; 
they are no more than one set of many interpretive lenses through which the 
material world may be viewed.  Yet, the Carhart majority ignores this 
competing logic regarding the concept of viability; it assumes instead that 
viability is neither an act of construction nor a spectrum with so many 
shades of gray.  The majority says nothing about these possibilities and, 
instead, remains committed to assuming that viability is fairly and 
appropriately conceptualized in dichotomous terms.93 
The question is why.  Why did the majority reject an opportunity to 
demonstrate what could be described as Justice Blackmun’s folly or, more 
benignly, his act of judicial construction?  Why did the majority ignore an 
occasion to propose that viability—having no clear, defined relationship to 
the material world—is an unsound structure around which to build an 
abortion right, and consequently, that the abortion right ought to be 
                                                                                                                 
twenty-week fetus was viable—not the alternative question of how much viability the 
particular twenty-week fetus has. 
 92. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 140 (citations omitted). 
 93. What if the Court apprehended and acknowledged viability as a concept that 
refused description in binary terms?  What if the Court respected that a fetus could have 
"some viability to it"—that it could limn the falsely dichotomous categories posited in Casey 
and the subsequent abortion cases?  Abortion jurisprudence would likely not crumble into an 
abyss of intelligibility as its foundation is pulled out from under it.  Rather, the Court might 
keep viability as the event which separates legal and illegal abortions; however, the Court 
would have to, explicitly, interpret this site.  Moreover, in the process of interpreting this 
site, the Court might have to admit that, contrary to the presuppositions upon which it has 
formerly relied, viability does not simply correspond to a site that exists "out there" in the 
material world.  Instead, there is some interpretive space between the signifier "viability" 
and the thing that it signifies.  Accordingly, when the Court names a moment as the moment 
of "viability," it constructs the thing that it names. 
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reconsidered?  I imagine that the majority felt no need to parse the 
metaphysics of viability in order to intimate towards the conclusion that the 
abortion right, as presently constructed, begs for its own dismantling.  The 
majority might be aware that with its simple offer that "by common 
understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while 
within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb," it has 
introduced the fetus as "life" into constitutional law and, in so doing, has 
paved the way for the reversal of Roe.94 
* * * 
In this Part, I have hoped to demonstrate that at the very foundation of 
Carhart rests the disputed proposition that the fetus is a morally significant 
"life" that deserves reverence of the highest order.  The majority opinion in 
Carhart proceeds from the assumption that the Court has found an answer 
to the vexing, divisive, highly debated question of what moral status ought 
to be given to the fetus.  Gone are the days when the Court felt itself 
incapable of deciding this question—when a humble majority once wrote, 
"We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.  When 
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and 
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary . . . is not in a 
position to speculate as to the answer."95  Retiring the humility that once 
characterized the Court’s approach to the ontological issues raised by 
abortion,96 the Carhart majority assumes that all fetuses, viable or not, are 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Other scholars have similarly interpreted Carhart as laying the conditions of 
possibility for the overturning of Roe.  See, e.g., Cynthia D. Lockett, The Beginning of the 
End:  The Diminished Abortion Right Following Carhart and Planned Parenthood, 11 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 337, 337–38 (2008) (giving a grim account of a fictional United 
States of the future, in which the Court’s decision in Carhart directly led to the reversal of 
Roe and the subsequent deaths of over 10,000 women from illegal abortions); Plante, supra 
note 36, at 389 ("Taken to its logical conclusion, Carhart diminishes the rights extended in 
Roe v. Wade so significantly that it suggests a de facto overruling of Roe is imminent."); 
Suter, supra note 42, at 1569 (arguing that Carhart represents "an attempt to strengthen the 
Court’s weighting of the state’s interest in potential human life, which may one day uphold a 
ban of previable abortions"); id. at 1586 (stating that Carhart "begins to undo the well-
established precedent that the state may not prohibit previable abortions and opens the door 
to future bans of previable abortion procedures based on visceral concerns about the 
sensibilities of the community and the medical profession"). 
 95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).  
 96. Ironically, while Carhart represents the Court moving away from a humility with 
regard to its confidence in its ability to decide the ontological questions and moral issues that 
abortion raises, the Court is arguably becoming more humble about its ability to be the 
grand, final arbiter of other moral questions.  Suzanne Goldberg writes about how the Court, 
in the past, had felt certain that it could declare the "right" morality; presently, however, the 
knowledge that it could not divine the "right" moral position among the various positions 
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entities with moral value—that is, that the fetus is a "life" in the morally 
significant, weighty, "supreme value" sense of the term.97  This proposition 
led the Court to the axiomatic conclusion that abortion harms women. 
Moreover, this proposition is what eviscerates the undue burden standard. 
Part III explores how ideas about the fetus as a morally significant, 
theologically informed, spiritually inclined "life" have been built into the 
undue burden standard.  This Part argues that when the undue burden 
standard proceeds from the assumption that the fetus is a morally 
consequential "life," the ability of the standard to protect the abortion right 
from diminishment decreases.  This Part goes on to trace the contours of an 
undue burden standard that refuses such assumptions—that is, the morally 
agnostic undue burden standard. 
III.  The Burdens of the Undue Burden Standard 
The undue burden standard represents the compromise that the 
Supreme Court has struck between competing social movements.98  This 
                                                                                                                 
that exist among the nation’s citizens has led the Court away from relying on morals-based 
rationales for laws.  Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking:  
Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1289 (2004).  Goldberg argues 
that,  
Whatever credibility the Court might have possessed previously to announce 
moral consensus on particular issues has slipped away entirely . . . .  The lack of 
an authoritative alternative to majoritarian preferences that could enable 
meaningful, objective assessment of proposed moral justifications has 
reinforced, in turn, the Court’s disinclination to rely on morality-based 
justification. 
Id. 
 97. Justice Kennedy has an established record of evoking "life" in its morally 
significant, weighty, "supreme value" sense.  See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart¸530 U.S. 914, 
979 (2000) (Kennedy J., dissenting) (noting the "intrinsic value of human life, including the 
life of the unborn"). 
 98. Some may argue that politics and social movements should play no role in 
Constitutional interpretation.  Nevertheless, it remains that Casey and its finding that the 
Constitution protects a woman’s right to abortion were, in part, the results of social 
movement and protest.  In her excursus on the doctrine of stare decisis, Justice O’Connor 
writes about the damage to the Court’s authority that would occur if the Court capitulated to 
the "pro-life" movement and overturned Roe just nineteen years after it was decided.  See 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (describing the danger in 
the scenario of the Court overturning Roe without demonstrating that it was acting 
independently of "political pressure," saying, "to overrule under fire in the absence of the 
most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s 
legitimacy beyond any serious question").  Indeed, O’Connor suggests that Roe should be 
upheld, if for no other reason than the fact that upholding Roe permits the Court to 
946 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2010) 
standard purports to balance the interests of those desiring to protect the 
(morally significant) "life" of the fetus from an untimely and premature 
"death" against the interests of those who may disagree that the fetus has a 
"life" or who may believe that, even conceding the existence of fetal "life," 
a woman ought not to be coerced to sustain the "life" of an unwanted 
fetus.99  However, the alive/dead binary, and the pathos with which the 
                                                                                                                 
demonstrate to the country that it is not a political branch.  See id. at 869 ("[T]o overrule 
Roe’s essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there 
was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to 
the Nation’s commitment to the rule of law.").  Essentially, O’Connor’s exposition concedes 
that politics and social movements indeed played a role in Casey—if only to convince the 
Justices to cling to Roe all the more tenaciously.  So conceded, it is fair to conclude that the 
undue burden standard intended was constructed in such a way as to bring the "contending 
sides of a national controversy to end their national division."  Id. at 867.  That is, it was a 
compromise. 
 99.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) ("Casey, in short, struck a balance.  
The balance was central to its holding.").  While the nature of this balance may be articulated 
as one between "individual rights" and "state interests," I do not think it incorrect to 
conceptualize the competition in terms of differing beliefs surrounding the moral status of 
the fetus.  Cf. Susan Frelich Appleton, Standards for Constitutional Review of Privacy-
Invading Welfare Reforms:  Distinguishing the Abortion-Funding Cases and Redeeming the 
Undue-Burden Test, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1, 53 (1996) ("As applied in Casey, the undue-burden 
test operates . . . as an expression of the ultimate balance between individual abortion rights 
and conflicting state interests . . . .").  Accordingly, while it is appropriate to claim that the 
undue burden standard balances the state’s interest in potential life against the woman’s 
individual right to an abortion, it is equally appropriate to claim that the undue burden 
standard balances the interests of those who believe that the moral status of the fetus as a 
"life" should (always, or in most cases) dictate the trajectory that pregnancies should take 
against those who do not believe that the fetus is a moral subject or who do not think that the 
fetus’s moral status is always dispositive.  Furthermore, the latter formulation might be a 
preferable description of the interests balanced by the undue burden standard insofar as it is 
frequently forms the substance behind slogans of "individual rights" and "state interests." 
Interestingly, when Justice O’Connor began formulating the undue burden test in her 
dissenting opinion in Akron, the standard was substantially different from the form that it 
would ultimately assume in Casey.  See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 
416, 461 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) ("The ‘undue burden’ in the abortion cases 
represents the required threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this court can require 
a state to justify its legislature actions under the exacting "compelling state interest 
standard.").  As Justice O’Connor articulates the undue burden standard, in Akron, a finding 
that a regulation imposed an "undue burden" on the abortion right did not mean that the 
regulation was constitutionally infirm; it meant that the reviewing court must then subject 
the regulation to strict scrutiny.  See id. (articulating the standard).  Alternatively, a finding 
that a regulation did not impose an "undue burden" on the abortion right meant that the 
reviewing court must subject the regulation to rational basis scrutiny.  See id. at 452 (arguing 
that if a regulation is not unduly burdensome, then the court should limit its determination to 
the question of whether "the negotiation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose"); see 
also Appleton, supra note 99, at 51 ("In its 1983 incarnation, Justice O’Connor’s undue-
burden test served as a threshold for strict scrutiny, with less burdensome interferences 
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Court describes the fetal "life" that would be "killed" by the intact D&E 
procedure—and all other abortion procedures—intimate that the Court has 
aligned itself ideologically with one of the competing social movements in 
this area.  Differently stated, the Court, with a modernist confidence, 
professes to know the moral status of fetal "life" and its inherent value; 
moreover, this is a knowledge, a truth, which the anti-abortion/pro–"life" 
campaign also claims to know.  The undue burden standard, as deployed in 
recent abortion jurisprudence, reflects this "truth" to the point that one 
could argue that the standard has become ineffective in accomplishing its 
purpose of balancing competing interests.100 
To elaborate upon the last point:  the undue burden standard must 
represent a balance between the interests of those who would protect fetal 
"life" against those who would protect the decisional autonomy and bodily 
integrity of the woman (a woman who may or may not ascribe to notions of 
fetal "life").101  The standard is less effective as a compromise when it 
                                                                                                                 
evoking only rational-basis review.").  Because a finding of an undue burden triggered strict 
scrutiny—a scrutiny that implies that a law regulates on the basis of a suspect classification 
or that a law infringes upon a fundamental right—while no such finding dictated that rational 
basis scrutiny was appropriate, one could argue that such a formulation of the undue burden 
standard balanced the interests of those who believed that the right to an abortion is a 
fundamental right against those who disagree. 
 100. Others have argued that the undue burden standard has become an ineffective 
protection of the abortion right because the Court uses it as if it was nothing more than a 
rational basis review.  See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 187 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting 
that "[i]nstead of the heightened scrutiny we have previously applied, the Court determines 
that a ‘rational’ ground is enough to uphold the Act"); see also Tepich, supra note 49, at 382 
("This new standard becomes even more troubling . . . when one realizes how far it strays 
from the precedent established in Casey . . . .  While claiming to use the undue-burden 
standard in Carhart, Justice Kennedy in fact employs rational-basis review . . . .").  While 
the undue burden standard may be approximating rational basis review, it is because the 
presumption of fetal "life" prevents the Court from being more critical of abortion 
regulations.  Cf. id. at 383 (arguing that the undue burden standard, as deployed by the Court 
in Carhart, represents a "compete evisceration of the Casey undue-burden standard" 
(quotations omitted)). 
 101. One scholar has similarly noted that the undue burden standard, as deployed in 
Carhart, no longer operates as an effective balance between competing interests; however, 
this scholar argues that the standard’s inefficacy results from the fact that the interest in 
women’s health and the interest in the life of the fetus weighed against one another in Casey.  
See Ivey, supra note 36, at 1486 (stating that prior to Carhart, "the woman’s interest in 
autonomy and choice weighs in direct opposition to the state’s interest in potential life").  
However, after Carhart, the interest in women’s health—that is, her psychological health—
weighs against abortion.  See id. (quoting Congressional findings, which avowed also that 
"[a] ban on the partial-birth abortion procedure will therefore advance the health interests of 
pregnant women seeking to terminate a pregnancy" (quotations omitted)).  When both the 
interest in fetal life and the interest in women’s health weigh against abortion, the undue 
burden standard balances nothing and tends to allow all restrictions on abortion to pass 
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purports to balance the interests of those who would protect (always already 
valuable) fetal "life" against those who would not protect (always already 
valuable) fetal "life."  A contest had on such terms pits a morally superior 
party against a morally debased one—a view of the abortion debate that an 
individual Justice may have but which, importantly, the standard must not 
embody and the jurisprudence must not reflect.  
Furthermore, when the undue burden standard endeavors to "balance" 
the interests of those who would protect the fetus’s right to "life" against 
those who would not protect the fetus’s right to "life," the standard and its 
operation function to merely reiterate the existence and value of fetal "life."  
It bears repeating that this is a position that is highly disputed102 and that the 
Court is not institutionally empowered to decide.103  Consider again the 
Court’s consideration of the criminal abortion statute at issue in Roe: 
                                                                                                                 
constitutional muster.  See id. (asking "[i]f the woman’s and fetus’s interests are in 
alignment," could "one possibly be an undue burden on the other"); see also id. at 1486–87 
(concluding that "in suggesting that regulations on abortion—even a unilateral prohibition—
promote a woman’s health by protecting her from emotional and psychiatric repercussions of 
her decisions, those opposing abortion are reconfiguring the undue burden test"). 
 102. Dworkin summarizes the debate concerning the moral status of the fetus as one 
between a side that "thinks that a human fetus is already a moral subject" and another side 
that "thinks that a just-conceived fetus is merely a collection of cells under the command not 
of a brain but of only a genetic code."  RONALD M. DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION:  AN 
ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 10 (1993).  My point 
is to emphasize that neither side of the debate concerning whether or not the fetus is a moral 
subject has emerged victorious; furthermore, I emphasize that neither side of the debate may 
ever emerge as victorious.  This is not to argue that we are required to be indifferent towards 
the question of the fetus’s moral status as a result of the impossibility of objective 
knowledge about it.  See TRIBE, ABORTION, supra note 74, at 119 ("[I]t’s hard to agree with 
those who insist that this question [of the fetus’s moral status], simply because it lacks a 
meaningful scientific or otherwise purely ‘objective’ and incontrovertible answer, can have 
no ‘answer’ at all."); see also id. at 120 ("We may have no answer, but we cannot deny 
either that the question is important or that it makes sense to ask it.").  But rather, it means 
that the judiciary may not legitimately incorporate one position regarding the fetus into the 
standard with which it balances the interests of those who believe in the moral significance 
of the fetus against those who disbelieve.  See infra Part III.A (expanding on this point).  
 103. Professor Charo’s work regarding the Human Embryo Research Panel is a 
constructive point of comparison.  See generally R. Alta Charo, The Hunting of the Snark:  The 
Moral Status of Embryos, Right-to-Lifers, and Third World Women, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
11 (1995).  The Human Embryo Research Panel, brimming with "expertise in embryology, 
medicine, law, philosophy, and personal experience," was assembled by the federal 
government to determine the moral status of the embryo such that guidelines could be 
formulated regarding the federal funding of embryo research.  Id. at 13.  Although the Panel did 
manage to produce guidelines, these guidelines were not based on the definitive moral status of 
the embryo having been found; indeed, "no clear-cut answer to the moral status of the embryo 
could be found."  Id. at 11.  Professor Charo argues that the guidelines "would have been 
immeasurably strengthened . . . if it had squarely acknowledged that it is impossible for a 
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Texas urges that . . . life begins at conception and is present throughout 
pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in 
protecting that life from and after conception.  We need not resolve the 
difficult question of when life begins.  When those trained in the 
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable 
to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development 
of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. 
It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on 
this most sensitive and difficult question.104 
The opinion then goes on to discuss theories regarding the beginning 
of morally significant "life" within various schools of thought and areas of 
the law, stating at one point that "[i]n areas other than criminal abortion, the 
law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, 
begins before live birth."105  This is an implicit recognition that it is 
legitimate and reasonable to believe that morally significant "life" begins 
subsequent to a live birth.  Yet, contrast that recognition with Carhart in its 
approving citation of Congress’s argument that "‘implicitly approving such 
a brutal and inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further 
coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable 
and innocent human life.’"106  Contrast Roe’s acknowledgement that the 
"life" of the "supreme value" kind may possibly only begin subsequent to a 
live birth with Carhart’s finding that the criminalization of intact D&E 
                                                                                                                 
governmental body to determine the moral status of the embryo . . . ."  Id. at 12.  She argues 
that the Panel’s conclusions regarding federal financing of embryo research would have been 
strengthened  "if they had been supported by arguments focusing on the interests of research 
opponents and proponents rather than conclusions concerning the moral status of the 
embryo."  Id. at 13.  Similarly, I argue that it is impossible for a governmental body—in this 
case, the judiciary—to determine the moral status of the fetus; yet, the Supreme Court in 
Carhart appears to have "determined" this status.  Moreover, while Charo contends that the 
Panel’s focus ought to have been on the interests of opponents and proponents of embryo 
research, I contend instead that the Court ought to "get out of the business" of philosophizing 
about the fetus’s moral status and proceed with a moral agnosticism towards this question. 
Id. at 159–60.  The undue burden standard should embody this agnosticism.  
 104. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973); see also Charo, supra note 103, at 20 
(reading this passage of Roe as articulating Justice Blackmun’s sense that "government 
cannot make findings of theological or philosophical fact on the status of prenatal life").  It 
should be obvious that the Roe Court in this passage was referencing morally significant 
"life," and not mere biological life, when it claims that it need not "resolve the difficult 
question of when life begins."  Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.  
 105. Roe, 410 U.S. at 161; see also Charo, supra note 103, at 20 (arguing that the Roe 
majority "opinion did not try to assign a precise moral or legal status to fetal life").  
 106. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007).  
950 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2010) 
procedures "expresses respect for the dignity of human life."107  While Roe 
hesitated to take a position with regard to the moral status of the fetus and 
the "life" it may or may not have, Carhart appears fully confident of the 
fetus’s moral status and is comfortable in allowing the decision to deny 
constitutional protection to the intact D&E procedure to hinge on that moral 
status.  And so, it would seem that not only has the post-Roe abortion 
jurisprudence rejected Roe’s trimester framework, but it has also rejected 
Roe’s refusal to decide that a morally intelligible "life" begins at some point 
prior to birth.  
In sum, the Court has accepted a disputable and disputed position 
about the moral status of the fetus by accepting the premise that the fetus 
has a morally meaningful "life"; furthermore, this presupposition has been 
wedged into the undue burden standard—making the question that the 
Court must answer in each instance that it hears a case regarding an 
abortion regulation one concerning how to strike a compromise between 
those interested in the fetus’s "life" and those not interested in its "life."  
Stated differently, when the undue burden proceeds from the assumption 
that the fetus is a "life," it overdetermines the questions that the Court asks 
when adjudicating the constitutionality of an abortion regulation. 
As presently conceptualized, the Court asks whether a regulation 
unduly burdens the abortion right by excessively expressing respect for and 
giving deference to the "life" of the fetus; conversely, the Court asks 
whether a regulation only, duly, burdens the abortion right by temperately 
and judiciously expressing respect for and giving deference to the "life" of 
the fetus.  These are problematic constructions of what qualifies as undue 
and due burdens.108  If reconceptualized in the way that I propose, an undue 
burden might be thought to reference those measures that impose upon the 
woman a conception of the inherent, moral value of fetal life—in 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. 
 108. The Casey plurality opinion explains that "undue burden" is synonymous with a 
"substantial obstacle"; accordingly, any legislation that places a substantial obstacle in a 
woman’s path to an abortion is, consequently, "unduly burdensome," and therefore 
unconstitutional.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) ("A 
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus.").  If the terms are indeed equivalents, then one may strike the 
adjectives from the phrases and read Casey’s holding as positing that the state may 
constitutionally impose "burdens" on, and "obstacles" in front of, a woman’s right to choose 
an abortion.  This may be a refreshingly honest portrayal of how scores of women, 
physically and mentally burdened with unwanted pregnancies, experience the state’s 
"legitimate"—and post-Casey, constitutional—expressions of its "profound respect" for the 
potential life of the fetus. 
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derogation of her own personal views concerning fetal life, or in derogation 
of whether she believes that those views should determine the trajectory 
that her pregnancy should take. Similarly, a due burden might be thought to 
refer to those measures that do not impose upon the woman any particular 
conception of the moral status of the fetus.  
When the ideology of one of the disputants is built into the very 
standard that is supposed to balance the interests of the disputants, the 
standard operates illegitimately.  In essence, the jurisprudential deck is 
stacked—to the detriment of the interests of one party.  The result is not 
justice (to the extent that justice within abortion jurisprudence is imagined 
as respect for competing moral worldviews within the law), but tautology.  
Effectively, to the extent that the undue burden standard has built into it the 
intrinsic and indisputable fact and value of fetal "life," the antiabortion 
movement has "captured the Judiciary." 109 
While I am making the argument that the Court has accepted a highly 
contested position regarding the moral status of the fetus and that the Court 
has illegitimately embedded this position into the undue burden standard, it 
is important to recognize that this argument is dramatically different from 
the claim that the government may never regulate based on some notion of 
morality.  While there are scholars who present forceful, convincing 
                                                                                                                 
 109. This is not to say that the undue burden standard has always operated 
illegitimately; that is, this is not to say that the notion that the fetus has a "life" has been built 
into the undue burden standard from its inception.  Consider the following:  Casey found that 
the undue burden standard suitably balanced the woman’s interest in terminating an 
unwanted pregnancy against "the interest of the State in the protection of potential life," and 
argued that while the "Roe Court recognized the State’s ‘important and legitimate interest in 
protecting the potentiality of human life,’" the trimester framework failed to adequately 
protect that potentiality due to the fact that it prohibited states from burdening the woman’s 
right to abortion during the first trimester.  Id. at 871 (emphasis added); see also id. at 873 
(saying that the trimester framework "undervalues the State’s interest in potential life").  The 
Casey plurality opinion appears indecisive as to whether it intends to argue that that which is 
aborted is "life" or "potential life."  At several points in the beginning of the opinion, Justice 
O’Connor writes that the question of abortion concerns "life or potential life."  Id. at 852.  
She notes that abortion is "an act that is fraught with consequences for others:  for the 
woman who must live with the implications of her decision; . . . and, depending on one’s 
beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted."  Id.  Elsewhere, she writes that "[t]he 
trimester framework . . . does not fulfill Roe’s own promise that the State has an interest in 
protecting fetal life or potential life."  Id. at 876.  Yet, as the opinion progresses, O’Connor 
appears to decide that that which is at stake in the question of abortion is not really life, but 
rather "potential life"; accordingly, she refers only to "potential life" in the latter Parts of the 
opinion.  See id. at 877–901 (referring only to "potential life" rather than "life or potential 
life").  Overall, it would appear that Casey was ambivalent with regard to the question of 
fetal "life"; accordingly, insofar as Carhart proceeds from the conviction that the fetus has a 
"life," it represents a dramatic departure from Casey. 
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arguments that "it is never permissible for government to regulate an 
individual’s behavior if the government’s primary motivation for the 
regulation is to enforce the moral beliefs of those who control the political 
process," and consequently, "government policy must be premised 
primarily on some rationale other than morality" in order to pass 
constitutional muster,110 this is not the argument that I am advancing here.  
Instead, I am willing to assume, arguendo, that included within the state’s 
broad police power is the power to regulate for the purpose of guarding the 
morality of the state’s subjects;111 as a result, I accept that the rationale for a 
regulation may be a bare moral conviction.112 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Gey, supra note 74, at 331.  Other scholars also make cogent arguments to the 
effect that the state ought to regulate with a moral neutrality—arguments with which I tend 
to agree.  In a scathing critique of the Defense of Marriage Act, a federal statute that sought 
to deny same-sex couples the right to legally marry, ethicist Walen argues that "our culture is 
permeated by a current of authoritarian moral thinking," with "many in our culture think[ing] 
that questioning or revising certain received truths only leads to chaos and immorality; they 
believe that if the state does not enforce their values, disaster will follow."  Alec Walen, The 
‘Defense of Marriage Act’ and Authoritarian Morality, 5 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 619, 
621 (1997).  Walen argues that the inability to see that there is "virtue in the state being 
neutral between competing moral conceptions . . . symbolizes the extent to which we as a 
culture have not yet come to terms with the ideals of liberty and equality that we espouse."  
Id.  However, it is not my aim, in this Article, to argue that the Constitution commands a 
moral relativism from states. 
 111. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 503 
(1986) (arguing that the police power "is an exercise of the sovereign right of the 
Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people" 
(emphasis added) (citing Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905))). 
 112. The Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas arguably restricted the truth of this 
statement.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ("‘[T]he fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not 
a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . .’" (quoting Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
Suzanne Goldberg makes an interesting argument that although the Supreme Court, 
prior to Lawrence v. Texas, consistently avowed that the state may shape public morality 
through law and, consequently, may pass laws that serve no other purpose but to guard the 
morality of the public, the post World War II Court had never upheld a law based on the sole 
justification that the law protected the morals of the people—with the only exception being 
the now-reversed decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.  See Goldberg, supra note 96, at 1235–
36, 1245 ("Notwithstanding its ubiquitous rhetorical endorsements of government’s police 
power to promote morality, it turns out that the Court has almost never relied exclusively 
and overtly on morality to justify government action.").  Goldberg argues that Bowers was 
anomalous insofar as it was the only decision since the mid-twentieth century to rely on a 
purely morals-based rationale for upholding a law.  Id. at 1256; see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 
196 (stating that "the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that 
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable" is an adequate rationale for upholding the 
law at issue).  She writes, "[M]ajority opinions in cases referencing and endorsing 
government’s power to regulate morals have almost never relied exclusively on an explicit, 
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However, the rationale for an abortion regulation may not be a bare 
moral conviction.  In effect, the undue burden standard affirmed that a 
woman’s interest in terminating a pregnancy was such an important one 
that it would not be subordinated to the morality of others, even a moral 
majority.113  Essentially, while the state may, generally speaking, impose 
its morality on its subjects by outlawing or regulating conduct on moral 
grounds, it cannot legitimately do so when the conduct involves 
abortion.114 
The undue burden standard is the tool with which the judiciary 
ensures that the state has not imposed its morality—specifically, its views 
                                                                                                                 
pure reference to morality to uphold a law, typically choosing instead to sustain government 
action based on observable societal harms."  Goldberg, supra note 96, at 1259.  She offers 
the Court’s decision in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slanton I, which is frequently cited as a case 
in which the Court affirmed the legitimacy of the state to regulate on the basis of morals 
alone, as nothing more than a rhetorical affirmation of "the sufficiency of morals-based 
rationales."  Id. at 1269 (citing Paris Adult Theatre v. Slanton I, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)).  She 
writes, "[T]he decision itself specifically disavowed reliance on moral interests. . . .  The 
Court’s reference to [the State’s right to maintain] a ‘decent society,’ although left 
undefined, must be understood to fall outside moral concerns, given the earlier stress on the 
morally neutral nature of the obscenity law."  Id. at 1269–70.  She also notes that the Court 
"identified several other interests that might legitimately support regulation of obscenity.  In 
connection with public safety, for example, the Court pointed to reports of ‘an arguable 
correlation between obscene material and crime.’"  Id. at 1270.  Goldberg goes on to explain 
the inconsistency between the Court’s pro-morals rhetoric and its anti-morals practice in 
terms of a tension between the Court’s desire and duty to screen whether morals-based 
rationales are merely a cover for impermissible and unconstitutional biases and the Court’s 
concern with the counter-majoritarian difficulties produced when it uses its own moral 
standards to strike down morality-protective laws passed by the electorate.  Id. at 1237–38. 
Gey argues, quite convincingly, that the rationale for a state policy ought never to be a 
bare moral conviction.  See Gey, supra note 74, at 331 ("[G]overnment policy must be 
premised primarily on some rationale other than morality . . . .").  He argues that moral 
regulation corrupts democracy insofar as it forces the morality of the present moral majority 
upon future citizens and moral majorities, indefinitely extending what would be temporary 
political power.  Id. at 332.  Accordingly, he would require that every regulation have both 
an "amoral purpose" as well as a "substantially amoral effect."  Id. at 391. 
 113. Gey, supra note 74, at 333 (arguing that "the Supreme Court typically exempts the 
category of fundamental rights from [the] general rule" that "the Constitution does not limit 
the government’s authority to regulate and enforce morality"); see also id. at 362 ("The 
constitutional demand that morally laden decisions be insulated from state regulation is also 
a central feature of the Court’s abortion decisions."); id. ("The Court’s drift away from the 
trimester framework of Roe v. Wade has not diminished the support a majority of the Court 
continues to express for the central element of moral relativism at the heart of the privacy 
right."). 
 114. See id. at 365 (contending that "the majority in Casey made the . . . determination 
that no governmental entity—neither the Court nor the legislature—may make the value 
judgment that abortion is immoral and then impose that judgment through legal sanctions on 
those who disagree"). 
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concerning the moral status of the fetus—on its subjects.  In so doing, the 
standard guarantees that there exists a space around the abortion decision 
wherein a woman would be free to decide whether and when over the 
course of the pregnancy she would grant the fetus a moral status, and if so, 
whether she would allow the moral status so granted to determine the 
trajectory of her pregnancy.  In other words, the undue burden standard 
would create conditions within which a moral pluralism could develop 
around the fetus and abortion, more generally.115 
A.  The Morally Agnostic Undue Burden Standard 
In order for the courts to ensure that the state’s view regarding the 
moral status of the fetus has not contaminated or contracted the space of 
moral pluralism that ought to surround the abortion decision, the undue 
burden standard must itself be uncommitted to any view of the fetus’s 
moral status.  Accordingly, when I describe the standard as operating 
illegitimately, this is to say that the standard is not proceeding with a moral 
agnosticism—a position that fully accepts that it does not know the truth of 
the fetus’s moral status and that an objective truth on the matter is an 
impossibility.  Instead, the standard currently proceeds with a conviction 
regarding the truth of the fetus as possessor of the supreme value of "life."  
Because the standard proceeds from the assumption held by one of the 
contesting parties in the abortion debate, the standard functions not as a 
dispassionate arbiter of competing parties’ interests, but rather as an 
apparatus that reiterates the correctness of one parties’ view while tending 
to decide questions in its favor. 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Dworkin has reached a similar conclusion, although he makes his argument in 
terms of "conformity" and "responsibility."  Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 72, 
at 408.  He argues that the state ought not to attempt to produce "conformity" in beliefs 
regarding the fetus’s moral status by imposing its views on the people; instead, the state 
should seek to instill "responsibility"—that is, deliberation about the significance of the 
fetus, pregnancy, and abortion.  Id.  He writes,  
If we aim at responsibility, we must leave citizens free, in the end, to decide as 
they think right, because that is what moral responsibility entails.  If, on the 
other hand, we aim at conformity, we deny citizens that decision.  We demand 
that they act in a way that might be contrary to their own moral convictions, and 
we discourage rather than encourage them to develop their own sense of when 
and why life is sacred. 
Id.  Essentially, Dworkin’s insistence that responsibility, as opposed to conformity, should 
be the aim of abortion regulations coincides with my argument that a moral pluralism should 
be allowed to develop around the fetus.  The undue burden standard, then, is the means of 
protecting that end. 
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While I maintain that the present undue burden standard is operating 
illegitimately, I also maintain that this illegitimacy is not an inherent one;116 
that is, the categories of undue and due burden need not presuppose the truth 
of one claimant’s position.  Consider the following:  The undue burden 
standard might operate more legitimately if, built into the standard, is not a 
positive philosophy regarding fetal life, but rather an agnosticism toward fetal 
life.117  It is important to clarify that an agnosticism toward fetal life does 
not argue that fetuses absolutely do not have an inherently valuable life.  
Instead, the agnosticism that I champion asserts that we—those in the 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Shortly after the Court in Casey announced that the undue burden standard was the 
new standard to use when adjudicating the constitutionality of abortion regulations, Metzger 
argued that the Court had provided little guidance regarding the methodology for applying 
the standard and, as a result, the standard was incapable of protecting the abortion right from 
being unnecessarily and unjustifiably burdened by regulations.  See Gillian E. Metzger, 
Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
94 COLUM L. REV. 2025, 2026 (1994) (seeking to "underscore the weakness of the standard 
in the form specified by the joint opinion" and "demonstrate[] that the abortion undue burden 
standard is virtually unique in its lack of protection against unnecessary and unjustified 
burdens on a constitutionally protected right").  Metzger drew upon other areas of 
constitutional law—the dormant Commerce Clause; the First Amendment analysis used for 
content-neutral, traditional forum speech; and the endorsement test of the Establishment 
Clause—to articulate a methodology that might be used to enable the undue burden standard 
to provide protection for the abortion right.  Id. at 2025.  While Metzger’s argument may be 
true, and while part of the reason why the undue burden standard is currently unable to 
defend the abortion right from being enfeebled by incrementalist regulation is the lack of 
methodological guidance offered in Casey, I believe that another important explanation of 
the standard’s feebleness is its acceptance of the notion of the fetus as a moral entity with an 
always already valuable "life"—that is, the standard has become enervated because 
embedded within it, at present, is the assumption that the fetus has a significant moral worth.  
Metzger did not address this corruption of the standard; her aim was to look at what was 
missing from the standard—not at what was present within it.  Accordingly, I offer the 
present analysis as a helpful addendum to Metzger’s vital and prescient work. 
 117. The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence parallels the argument that I 
make here regarding the undue burden standard.  Gey argues that in the free exercise of 
religion cases,  
The Court does not merely require the political majority to tolerate contrary 
views.  Rather it affirmatively adopts the amoral position:  The government may 
not prohibit political, religious, or moral dissent because under our constitutional 
system the government is denied the power to endorse one version of truth over 
another. 
The Establishment Clause is the specific embodiment of this requirement 
that the government maintain an agnostic attitude towards religion.   
Gey, supra note 74, at 358.  With respect to the fetus, the government ought to similarly 
adopt the "amoral position," as "the government is denied the power to endorse one version 
of [fetal] truth over another."  Id.  The basis of this argument is not the Establishment 
Clause, but rather the importance of the abortion right and the undue burden standard’s 
status as an apparatus that balances competing interests. 
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anti-abortion/pro-"life" camp, those in the pro-choice movement, 
philosophers, theologians, pregnant women, nonpregnant women, lawyers, 
state and federal legislators, and importantly, the judiciary—do not know 
whether fetuses have an inherently valuable "life."  They might; they might 
not.  In the absence of an answer to this question, the standard that balances 
the interests of those who would answer the question differently must not 
commit to an answer to the question; indeed, the standard must actively 
commit to an acknowledgment that it does not know the answer to the 
question.118  An undue burden standard with an agnosticism toward fetal 
life, then, would balance the interests of those who believe that fetuses have 
meaningful moral value against those who disagree or who prioritize the 
morally significant life of the woman and the path that she wants her extant 
life to take above the "life" or potential life of the fetus. 
If one accepts the proposition that the undue burden standard operates 
illegitimately when it proceeds from the assumption that the fetus possesses 
an inherently valuable "life," and if one accepts the proposition that the 
standard would operate more legitimately if it proceeds with a certain 
agnosticism toward fetal life, then one has to reconcile these propositions 
with the guidance that the Casey plurality gave when it first enunciated the 
undue burden standard.  In Casey, the plurality specified that "undue burden 
is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus."119  It continued: 
A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the 
State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform 
the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.  And a statute which, while 
furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, 
has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s 
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its 
legitimate ends.120 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Essentially, the morally agnostic undue burden standard respects the plurality of 
moral views concerning the fetus.  As such, it will be a hard pill to swallow for those who 
"cannot abide the thought of [having] merely one moral view among many," as the law will 
not necessarily reflect "their moral outlook."  Walen, supra note 110, at 639.  And so, the 
morally agnostic undue burden standard is a response to "the current of moral 
authoritarianism," as it forces would-be moral authoritarians to understand competing moral 
positions regarding the fetus not as immoral positions, but rather, truly, competing moral 
positions. 
 119. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 120. Id. (emphasis added). 
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One can ground the contours of a morally agnostic undue burden 
standard in this passage.  Here, the Court articulates two components of an 
abortion regulation:  its purpose and its effect.121  While a legislature may 
take a position regarding the moral status of the fetus and regulate abortion 
from the assumption that the fetus has/is an inherently valuable "life," this 
speaks only to the purpose prong of the analysis.  That is, a state may 
regulate with the purpose of dissuading women from having abortions and, 
thereby, protecting fetal "life."122  However, this purpose may not 
                                                                                                                 
 121. One scholar has recently conducted an especially insightful exploration of Casey’s 
directive that a law places an unconstitutional undue burden on the abortion right when it 
"‘has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion.’"  Note, After Ayotte:  The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed 
"Purpose", 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2566 (2006) [hereinafter After Ayotte] (emphasis 
added) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).  The author argues that although, "[b]y its plain 
terms, this is a disjunctive test," the Supreme Court and most lower courts have refused to 
analyze abortion regulations’ purposes as distinct from their effects.  Id.  The author notes 
that the Court’s opinion in Mazurek v. Armstrong indicated the Court’s awareness of the 
possibility of disarticulating legislative purposes from legislative effects.  Id. at 2566 (citing 
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)).  In Mazurek, the Court 
wrote, "[E]ven assuming . . . that a legislative purpose to interfere with the constitutionally 
protected right to abortion without the effect of interfering with that right . . . could render 
the . . . law invalid[,] there is no basis for finding a vitiating legislative purpose here."  
Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972.  "We do not assume unconstitutional legislative intent even when 
statutes produce harmful results; much less do we assume it when the results are harmless."  
Id. (citations omitted).  Although this language appears rather pessimistic on the likelihood 
that the Court will ever strike a law based on its unconstitutional purpose, the author remains 
hopeful, concluding that Mazurek can "be read as agnostic toward the purpose prong."  After 
Ayotte, supra at 2566; cf. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1008 n.19 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg’s Stenberg concurrence "suggest[s] that even if 
the Nebraska statute does not impose an undue burden . . . , the statute is unconstitutional 
because it has the purpose of imposing an undue burden," and that "Ginsburg’s presumption 
is . . . squarely inconsistent . . . with our opinion in Mazurek"). 
The proposal contained within this Article similarly understands as a disjunctive test 
Casey’s directive that a law may not have the "purpose or effect" of creating a substantial 
obstacle in front of the abortion right.  However, unlike the Note discussed above, this 
Article’s proposal does not argue that the Court ought to strike laws based on 
unconstitutional purposes.  Instead, this Article’s proposal removes legislative purposes from 
judicial review while providing guidance to the Court seeking to determine whether a law 
has unconstitutional effects. 
 122. In truth, the claim that a state may regulate with the purpose of dissuading women 
from undergoing an abortion may actually concede too much.  To be sure, Casey explicitly 
stated that "an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus."  Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added).  One may argue 
that this directive prohibits a state from passing regulations with the purpose of deterring 
women from having abortion.  However, the riposte would be that this statement from Casey 
does not prevent states from regulating with the purpose of dissuading women from 
abortion; it only prevents states from regulating with the purpose of dissuading women from 
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overwhelm a statute’s effects.  There are at least two ways for a morally 
committed legislature to accomplish this necessary disjunction between its 
purposes and a regulation’s effects. 
One way is to join a purpose to champion a belief in the moral 
consequence of the fetus with an additional purpose that is silent on the 
question of the fetus’s moral status.  Combining a morally salient purpose 
with a morally silent one arguably produces a statute that has a morally 
neutral effect.  An instructive, but far from obvious, place to look for 
understanding this technique is First Amendment case law concerning nude 
dancing.   
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,123 the Court was called upon to 
determine the constitutionality of an Indiana public indecency statute that 
proscribed all forms of complete public nudity and, in so doing, required 
would-be nude dancers to wear G-strings and pasties.124  A splintered Court 
held that the statute violated neither the dancers’ nor the club proprietors’ 
rights to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment.125  
After finding that nonobscene nude dancing "is expressive conduct within 
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, . . . [but] only marginally 
so,"126 the plurality, reviewing the law with a lower level of scrutiny than 
the strict scrutiny that it typically used for regulations that infringe upon 
protected conduct, found the public indecency statute "justified despite its 
                                                                                                                 
abortion when that legislative purpose places a substantial obstacle in front of the abortion 
right.  Simply put, mere dissuasion does not amount to a substantial obstacle.  Moreover, 
Casey goes on to explicitly affirm that a state may pass laws "designed to persuade [the 
pregnant woman] to choose childbirth over abortion."  Id. at 878 (emphasis added). 
At any rate, the purpose prong of Casey has gone relatively unexplored, and it ought to 
be plumbed for the potential that is has to protect the abortion right from further 
diminishment.  See Tobin, supra note 36, at 126 (arguing that elucidation of the purpose 
prong in Casey has been minimal); see also After Ayotte, supra note 121, at 2569 (arguing 
that the purpose prong needs to be explored as it can function to reduce costs on the 
judiciary by striking laws that are clearly inconsistent with established precedent). 
 123. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571–72 (1991) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that the Indiana statute did not violate the dancers’ or club owners’ First 
Amendment rights).  
 124. Id. at 563.  
 125. Id. at 571–72.  
 126. Id. at 565–66.  Some commentators have emphasized that the Court did not 
provide any explanation for its finding that nude dancing was expressive conduct, and if so, 
why it was only "marginally" protected by the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Amy Adler, 
Girls! Girls! Girls!:  The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 
1114 (2005) (noting that "[w]ithout further explanation," the plurality determined that nude 
dancing was expressive conduct, but "exiled" it "to this undefined and previously unheard of 
‘margin’ of the First Amendment"). 
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incidental limitations on some expressive activity."127  Furthermore, 
Indiana’s interest in protecting the people’s morality, alone, was a 
legitimate justification for the law.  Citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. 
Slaton,128 and Bowers v. Hardwick,129 the plurality wrote, "This and other 
public indecency statutes were designed to protect morals and public order.  
The traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to 
provide for the public health, safety, and morals, and we have upheld such a 
basis for legislation."130 
Nine years later in City of Erie v. Pap’s, A.M.,131 the Court was asked, 
once again,132 to determine the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania public 
indecency ordinance that functioned to require all would-be nude dancers to 
don G-strings and pasties.133  Reviewing the statute under the same lower 
level of scrutiny that it used in Barnes,134 a plurality held that the ordinance 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567. 
 128. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (upholding a Georgia 
statute prohibiting the showing of obscene movies partly on the grounds that the state could 
"protect ‘the social interest in order and morality’" (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 485 (1957))). 
 129. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding a Georgia statute 
criminalizing "homosexual sodomy" on the grounds that the state could regulate on "notions 
of morality"). 
 130. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion).  This 
point was emphasized by Justice Scalia, writing in concurrence.  Noting that he did not think 
that the statute regulated expressive conduct and, accordingly, did not implicate the First 
Amendment at all, Justice Scalia argued that the regulation ought to have been reviewed 
under a rational basis scrutiny.  Id. at 580 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Furthermore, morality 
was a rational basis for regulating. See id. at 575 ("Our society prohibits, and all human 
societies have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but because they 
are considered, in the traditional phrase, ‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e., immoral.").  
Accordingly, he would have upheld the statute as a rational effort to protect the morality of 
the community.  See id. at 580 ("Moral opposition to nudity supplies a rational basis for its 
prohibition."). 
 131. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that the Pennsylvania ordinance did not violate the First Amendment because it 
passed the O’Brien test).  
 132. The lower courts argued that the Barnes decision was splintered in such a way that 
no clear precedent could be derived from it.  See id. at 285 (quoting the lower court’s 
statement that "‘aside from the agreement by a majority of the Barnes Court that nude 
dancing is entitled to some First Amendment protection, we can find no point on which a 
majority of the Barnes Court agreed’" (emphasis added) (quoting City of Erie v. Pap’s, 
A.M., 719 A.2d 273, 277 (Pa. 1998))).  
 133. See id. at 289 (describing the issue before the Court).  
 134. See id. (affirming that the instant ordinance, like the ordinance at issue in Barnes, 
should be reviewed with the less demanding O’Brien test). 
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did not violate the First Amendment;135 however, this time, the Court did 
not base its decision on the notion that morality alone provided sufficient 
grounds for banning public nudity.136  Instead, the Court held that the 
statute was a permissible infringement on dancers’ and proprietors’ right to 
freedom of expression because the state was justified in seeking to prevent 
negative "secondary effects" of nude dancing and nude dancing 
establishments.137  In explaining that the ordinance did not have the purpose 
of banning the "erotic message" conveyed by nude dancing, but rather had 
the purpose of regulating the "secondary effects" of nude dancing, the Court 
wrote: 
The ordinance prohibiting public nudity is aimed at combating crime 
and other negative secondary effects caused by the presence of adult 
entertainment establishments like Kandyland . . . .  Put another way, the 
ordinance does not attempt to regulate the primary effects of the 
expression, i.e., the effect on the audience of watching nude erotic 
dancing, but rather the secondary effects, such as the impacts on public 
health, safety, and welfare, which we have previously recognized are 
"caused by the presence of even one such" establishment.138 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See id. at 296 (concluding that the public indecency ordinance is "justified under 
O’Brien"). 
 136. See id. (stating that "public health" and "safety" justified the use of the state’s police 
powers).  The refusal of the plurality to rest its holding on the state’s interest in morality was 
lamented by Justice Scalia in his concurrence.  See id. at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The 
traditional power of government to foster good morals (bonos mores), and the acceptability of 
the traditional judgment . . . that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not been repealed 
by the First Amendment.").  
 137. Id. at 291 (plurality opinion).  In his concurrence in Barnes, Justice Souter 
presciently championed the view that public indecency statutes like the ones at issue in Barnes 
and Pap’s should be upheld under a "secondary effects" rationale.  See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (writing "separately to . . . [concur] in 
the judgment, not on the possible sufficiency of society’s moral views to justify the limitations 
at issue, but on the State’s substantial interest in combating the secondary effects of adult 
entertainment establishments").  He partially dissented in Pap’s because he believed that the 
plurality, and his earlier concurring opinion in Barnes, erred insofar as neither required the state 
to show evidence revealing "the seriousness of the threatened harm or . . . the efficacy of its 
chosen remedy."  City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 314 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
He blamed his earlier failure in Barnes to demand an evidentiary basis for the regulation at 
issue on "[i]gnorance, sir, ignorance."  Id. at 316.  
 138. Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 291 (plurality opinion) (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41, 47–48, 50 (1986)).  In the preamble to the ordinance, the council had stated that 
the regulation was directed at "nude live entertainment" establishments, whose "‘activity 
adversely impacts and threatens to impact on the public health, safety and welfare by providing 
an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, public intoxication, prostitution, 
the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and other deleterious effects.’"  Id. at 290 
(quoting Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 279 (Pa. 1998)).  That "nude live 
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In resting its decision on the state’s interest in regulating "secondary 
effects," the Supreme Court implicitly rejected the claim that morality is a 
sufficient, or legitimate, justification for laws that infringe upon recognized 
constitutional rights.139 
Pap’s suggests that the state may be convinced of the immorality of a 
nude body displayed in public.  It may, as a consequence, ban public nudity 
for the purpose of protecting the moral well-being of the community.  
However, in order for a regulation so intended to pass constitutional muster, 
its moral purpose must be combined with another, nonmoral purpose—like 
the prevention of the violence, criminality, and disease that is thought to be 
associated with public nudity.  We can begin a productive analogy to 
abortion jurisprudence:  Consider Casey’s discussion of a rule that requires 
women to be informed that "there are procedures and institutions to allow 
adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree of state assistance 
if the mother chooses to raise the child herself."140  Such a rule may have 
been promulgated by a state convinced that the fetus is/has a "life."  It may 
have passed the rule with the purpose of likening the fetus to an infant and, 
in so doing, convincing the woman that her fetus is a "life."  However, in 
order for the rule so intended to pass constitutional muster, its moral 
purpose must be combined with another, nonmoral purpose—like the 
simple intent to make sure women faced with unwanted pregnancies are 
                                                                                                                 
entertainment" establishments have such "deleterious effects" on the communities in which 
they are situated has been questioned.  See, e.g., Adler, supra note 126, at 1125 ("What 
exactly is so dangerous about the naked female body?  Why make this leap from sexuality to 
violence?"). 
 139. See Adler, supra note 126, at 1119 (noting that the rationale offered by the Court 
in Pap’s "eclipsed the Barnes plurality’s dubious reliance on morality").  Although the 
Court’s holding in Pap’s represents a decided move away from morals-based legislation, it 
nevertheless has been criticized by politically liberal commentators.  The Pap’s dissenters, 
which included Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, argued that the plurality’s acceptance of the 
"secondary effects" rationale in the context of a regulation that imposed incidental effects on 
speech was novel and improper, as the "secondary effects" doctrine had, until then, only 
been used in the context of adjudicating the legality of zoning restrictions.  See Pap’s, 529 
U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (terming the plurality’s decision a "doctrinal polyglot").  
The dissenters also pointed out the seeming illogic in the majority’s reasoning—that is, that 
the violence, criminality, and disease that were thought to be an adjunct to nude dancing 
establishments could be prevented by requiring dancers to wear G-strings and pasties.  See 
id. at 323 ("To believe that the mandatory addition of pasties and a G-string will have any 
kind of noticeable impact on secondary effects requires nothing short of a titanic surrender to 
the implausible.").  Indeed, the plurality appeared to admit as much.  See id. at 301 (plurality 
opinion) ("To be sure, requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings may not greatly 
reduce these secondary effects, but O’Brien requires only that the regulation further the 
interest in combating such effects."). 
 140. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992). 
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aware of the breadth of their options.141  The combination of the morally 
salient purpose with the morally silent one helps to ensure that the 
regulation has a morally neutral effect.  Indeed, informing women that they 
may be entitled to welfare assistance should they decide to carry the 
pregnancy to term appears to be a morally neutral piece of advice—saying 
very little to nothing at all about the legislature’s beliefs in the moral status 
of the fetus. 
Yet, combining a morally salient purpose with a morally silent one is 
just one technique of ensuring the moral neutrality of a law’s effect.  There 
is another way to ensure that a state’s intent to champion its moral views 
regarding the fetus does not overwhelm a regulation’s effects:  If the state 
insists upon coercing a woman to hear arguments in favor of understanding 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Pap’s raises the question of whether the constitutionality of a law ought to depend 
on the legitimacy of the state’s motives in passing it.  That is, if a state bans public nudity 
with the improper purpose of squelching the erotic message that nude dancers communicate, 
should the regulation be saved from unconstitutionality if the state can point to a proper 
purpose for the regulation—like preventing the negative "secondary effects" of nude dancing 
establishments—although that purpose may not have been the actual motivation for the 
regulation?  The Pap’s plurality answered the question in the affirmative, stating that "this 
Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit 
motive."  Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 292.  The danger in the Court’s holding lies in the possibility 
that the state will knowingly infringe First Amendment rights, yet offer a post hoc 
rationalization for the infringement that then saves the law from unconstitutionality.  See, 
e.g., Marcy Strauss, From Witness to Riches:  The Constitutionality of Restricting Witness 
Speech, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 317 (1996) (arguing that allowing states to proffer "secondary 
effects" as a post hoc justification for regulations that infringe upon speech "permits an end 
run around the First Amendment:  The government can always point to some neutral, non-
speech justification for its action"). 
The analogous question in the abortion context is whether a regulation should be saved 
from unconstitutionality if a morally silent purpose for it could be divined, although the state 
might have actually passed the law with a morally salient purpose.  For two reasons, the 
answer to this must also be an affirmative one.  First, a state’s purpose in passing a law does 
not overdetermine how it will affect women.  Because the morally agnostic undue burden 
standard inquires into the moral neutrality of the effects of laws, a state’s intent to convince a 
woman that her fetus is/has a "life" by requiring that she be given a list of adoption agencies, 
for example, does not translate into women actually hearing the state’s moral message; it 
does not translate into the law having the effect of speaking to the fetus’s moral status.  The 
morally silent purpose of making women aware of the range of options available to them—a 
purpose the state may not have had—ensures the quieting of the state’s moral message.  
Second, the state’s actual, moral purpose in passing a law ought not to render a statute 
unconstitutional because abortion jurisprudence to date suggests that it is absolutely 
permissible for a state to regulate abortion with moral purposes.  See infra notes 142–46 and 
accompanying text (discussing Rust v. Sullivan and Casey, which provide that states may 
regulate abortion with moral purposes).  To ensure the moral neutrality of the effects of laws 
passed with moral purposes, however, the state must present both sides of the moral debate.  
This is the argument that I next develop.  See infra notes 147–49 and accompanying text 
(suggesting a new standard).  
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the fetus as a "life," then the state should be required to also provide 
information regarding alternative moral views.  If both sides of the debate 
regarding the fetus’s moral status are presented, one can conclude that the 
regulation has a morally neutral effect.  
Casey, together with the Court’s decision in Rust v. Sullivan,142 
intimate that a legislature need not be reserved when advocating its moral 
views of the fetus—that is, that a state need not always combine a morally 
salient purpose with a morally silent one in order to save a regulation from 
unconstitutionality.  Indeed, Rust and Casey suggest that the state may 
openly promote its beliefs in fetal "life."  When upholding a federal 
regulation that prohibited recipients of Title X funds from providing 
abortions, abortion counseling, or referrals to abortion providers—and, in 
the course of so doing, restricted the ability of the indigent women who rely 
upon the recipients of Title X funds to elect an abortion—the majority in 
Rust, citing Maher v. Roe,143 wrote that "the government may ‘make a value 
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that 
judgment . . . .’"144  Furthermore, in Casey, the plurality explained that "a 
state measure designed to persuade [the pregnant woman] to choose 
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to" the state’s 
goal of expressing "profound" respect of the fetus;145 moreover, "[e]ven in 
the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations 
designed to encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social 
arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing 
the pregnancy to full term."146  However, while a state may "make a value 
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion" and inform a woman about 
"philosophic and social arguments of great weight" that may counsel her to 
bring her pregnancy to term, the Court has never held that the state may do 
this to the exclusion of informing a woman about "philosophic and social 
arguments of great weight" concerning the sociogenesis of the fetus as a 
"life."147  The Court has never argued that the state must not inform a 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (concluding that regulations 
restricting the use of federal funds to fund abortions do not violate "the First or Fifth 
Amendments to the Constitution"). 
 143. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (holding that Connecticut did not 
violate the Constitution by refusing to fund nontherapeutic abortions). 
 144. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192–93 (quoting Roe, 432 U.S. at 474). 
 145. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
 146. Id. at 872–73.  
 147. In Rust, the majority argued that the abortion rights of indigent women were not 
violated by the state’s refusal to allocate funds to enable them to actually procure 
abortions—although the refusal effectively precluded poor women from exercising any 
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woman that "reasonable people, throughout the centuries, have disagreed" 
about the truth of those weighty "philosophic and social arguments . . . that 
can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term."148  
The state convinced of fetal "life" must present both sides of the argument 
if the regulation is not to corrupt the space of moral pluralism that should 
surround the exercise of an important right; indeed, the state convinced of 
fetal "life" must present both sides of the debate if abortion jurisprudence is 
                                                                                                                 
abortion rights that they may have.  Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.  The Court said, "In so doing, the 
Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund 
one activity to the exclusion of the other."  Id. at 193.  This statement may be read to imply 
that the state may also promote one viewpoint (i.e., the fetus is/has a "life") to the exclusion 
of others (i.e., the moral status of the fetus is unknown and is subject to debate, the fetus is 
only "potential life," etc.).  However, the Rust majority was careful to limit its holding to the 
specific context of Title X; it took pains to articulate that women remained wholly free to 
receive abortions, abortion counseling, and abortion referrals from non-Title X providers.  
See id. at 203 ("Under the Secretary’s regulations, however, a doctor’s ability to provide, and 
a woman’s right to receive, information concerning abortion and abortion-related services 
outside the context of the Title X project remains unfettered." (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 
U.S. 464, 475 (1977))).  The distinction between negative rights and positive rights was 
paramount in the decision.  See id. at 193 ("There is a basic difference between direct state 
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity 
consonant with legislative policy.").  Accordingly, it does not follow that, outside of the 
Title X context, the state may encourage one viewpoint of the fetus over another.  That is, 
although the state may have no affirmative duty to help women realize their rights, the state 
nevertheless may not interfere in the exercise of rights—by championing one view of the 
fetus over another.  Moreover, if Casey allows the state to so interfere by allowing women to 
be told of "philosophic and social argument of great weight that can be brought to bear in 
favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term," then the interference must be impartial; 
women must be informed of alternative arguments. 
 148. Gey makes an interesting argument concerning this point.  He writes,  
[I]f a woman has a right to determine for herself the attributes of personhood 
that attach to the fetus, it is inconsistent to uphold legislation intended to ensure 
that a woman makes her moral decision about abortion in a "thoughtful and 
informed" manner, and that she takes into account all the "philosophic and social 
arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing her 
pregnancy to full term." 
Gey, supra note 74, at 363 n.171 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 872).  Certainly, the state 
denies the woman the full opportunity to decide which attributes of personhood that she 
believes attaches to the fetus when it gives only a partial survey of the "philosophic and 
social arguments of great weight" pertaining to the fetus.  Accordingly, I argue that, instead 
of denying a state interested in protecting fetal "life" the opportunity to present arguments 
that favor the continuation of a pregnancy, the state may do so only if such arguments are in 
addition to a presentation of arguments that do not lead her to continue her pregnancy 
because of a moral imperative demanded by the fetus’s status as a moral entity.  As such, a 
more generous review of the "philosophic and social arguments of great weight" spoken of 
by Justice O’Connor would not function to "manipulate the moral decisions of pregnant 
women" in the way that Gey fears.  Id. 
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to be consistent with Lawrence and the developments in First Amendment 
Law, both counseling that the state may not legitimately impose its morality 
on its subjects.149 
In sum, when a regulation is challenged, the morally agnostic undue 
burden standard can be used to determine if, in practice, the morally 
committed legislature succeeded in creating law that was sufficiently 
morally agnostic in its effect.  If the effect of the law shows a commitment 
to a moral position regarding the fetus—because it has a sole purpose to 
convince a woman about the propriety of the state’s views regarding the 
fetus’s moral status, or because it champions one view regarding the fetus 
to the exclusion of other views—an agnostic undue burden standard must 
strike it down.150 
As such, a legislature, convinced of the always already "life" and 
consequent moral value of the fetus may have the purpose of "creat[ing] a 
structural mechanism that express[es] profound respect for the life of the 
unborn"; however, that structural mechanism must not show the state’s 
                                                                                                                 
 149. See Adler, supra note 126, at 1119 n.52 ("Morality has always been a problematic 
justification of banning speech; it has become even more so in light of the Court’s decision 
to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick [with Lawrence], on which the Barnes plurality had 
partially relied." (citations omitted)). 
 150. Other scholars have proposed an undue burden standard that disaggregates the 
purpose of a regulation from its effects.  See Gey, supra note 74, at 391 (arguing that, when 
reviewing an abortion regulation, the Court should determine if a regulation has a "primarily 
amoral purpose," as well as a "substantially amoral effect"); Metzger, supra note 116, at 
2043–44 (arguing that the undue burden standard should reflect the dormant Commerce 
Clause standard insofar as the latter’s two-tiered approach provides insight as to how judges 
could examine unduly burdensome purpose and effects);  id. at 2044 (noting that "[i]n 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the illegitimate purpose is economic protectionism and 
discrimination," while "in the abortion context, it is the intentional creation of substantial 
obstacles in the path of a woman seeking to abort a nonviable fetus"); id. at 2045 (noting that 
in the effects prong of both dormant Commerce Clause analysis and the undue burden 
standard, "increased costs and delays, even if incidental, may prove to be undue burdens"); 
cf. Appleton, supra note 99, at 62–63 (arguing that a regulation’s purpose and effects should 
be considered together); id. at 62 ("[I]f an anti-abortion purpose alone spelled invalidity, the 
[Casey] opinion could not have cited . . . Justice O’Connor’s previous dissents, which 
regularly ignored a statute’s anti-abortion purposes to focus instead on the absence of an 
undue burden according to the law’s effects."); id. at 62–63 (arguing that if anti-abortion 
effects alone determined invalidity, it would make the undue-burden test "unnecessarily 
problematic" because it "would implicate a wide range of decisions . . . that have unintended 
effects and consequences"); id. at 63 ("While the abortion-funding cases virtually conceded 
the anti-abortion purposes underlying the selective funding schemes they upheld, the cases 
emphasized the absence of any cognizable effect on the challengers."). 
While other scholars have argued that a regulation might have unduly burdensome 
purposes or unduly burdensome effects, this instant proposal is the first to suggest a 
disarticulation of the moral purpose of a regulation from its moral effects. 
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metaphorical cards so to speak, as the effect of the mechanism must do no 
more than to clear a space for the woman’s contemplation of fetal life.151  
Accordingly, the regulation must say nothing at all about fetal "life" (at 
least ostensibly), or it must present arguments both for and against 
according a moral status to the fetus.  A morally agnostic undue burden 
standard, then, would determine whether the regulation is morally neutral in 
practice and as experienced by women.  Differently stated, the rehabilitated 
standard proposed herein would simply determine if a law has the effect of 
providing women with a morally neutral occasion for reflection. 
Accordingly, the undue burden standard that I propose would tell the 
following story:  The standard was a compromise—between a social 
movement that champions the belief that the fetus has a significant moral 
status and that this status should determine the telos of a pregnancy and a 
social movement that disputes this moral status and/or disputes that the 
fetus’s moral status should determine the course of a woman’s pregnancy.  
While the state could proceed from the assumption that the fetus has a 
moral status and pass regulations that express profound respect for the 
morally significant "life of the fetus," the undue burden standard, however, 
will review these regulations with an eye towards determining whether they 
have unconstitutionally corrupted the space of moral pluralism that ought to 
surround the abortion decision.  The nuance here is crucial:  While state or 
federal legislatures can hold a particular view of the moral status of the 
fetus, the judiciary, armed with and deploying the undue burden standard, 
must ensure that that view has not corrupted the ability of the woman to 
decide upon her fetus’s moral status and that status’s implication for her 
immediate pregnancy.  In so doing, the morally agnostic undue burden 
standard would patrol the space of moral pluralism that ought to surround 
the fetus and abortion, more generally. 
B.  The Present Undue Burden Standard, Redux 
A morally agnostic undue burden standard, then, would ask 
different questions than the present undue burden standard.  Where the 
current standard asks, Does this regulation excessively express profound 
respect for fetal life, or does it express this profound respect 
moderately?, a morally agnostic standard would ask, Does this 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See Appleton, supra note 99, at 67 (arguing that "the goal of the restrictions 
upheld in Casey is not to decrease abortion but rather simply to push women to think longer 
and harder about abortion"). 
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regulation do no more than clear a space wherein a woman can 
deliberate as to whether her fetus is an inherently valuable life and, if so, 
whether she can live with a decision to terminate it?  The former set of 
questions distorts the terms of the compromise that the Supreme Court 
aimed to strike by putting forth the undue burden standard; the latter set 
better acknowledges competing moral worldviews involved in the 
abortion debate. 
Furthermore, when one understands the substance of the questions 
that comprise the present, morally committed undue burden standard—
when one understands that the Court is looking into the zeal with which 
a regulation expresses its profound respect for the always already 
valuable "life" of the fetus—one can see that the undue burden standard 
in its present deployment is fundamentally different from other 
standards used by the Supreme Court.  That is, although the undue 
burden standard looks and sounds like an objective constitutional test, 
the questions asked by the illegitimately operating, present undue 
burden standard are vividly different than those asked by other 
constitutional standards.152  Consider this:  What if, when employing 
                                                                                                                 
 152. It is important to note that I am not arguing that the undue burden standard is the 
incorrect standard to utilize in abortion jurisprudence—that some other standard, like strict 
scrutiny or a more robust intermediate scrutiny, is more appropriate.  Other scholars have 
competently made such cases.  See, e.g., id. at 53 (noting that the undue burden standard "is 
a balance that, while favoring the government more than the balance fashioned by Roe v. 
Wade, nevertheless offers more hope to challengers than traditional rational-basis review").  
Metzger has similarly contemplated the appropriate level of scrutiny that the undue burden 
standard ought to represent, contending that while it may appear that the undue burden 
standard is equivalent to an intermediate scrutiny, it is, in practice, more akin to a rational 
basis review.  She states that "Casey’s reference to substantial obstacles as unconstitutional, 
and its emphasis on balancing the interests of the state and the pregnant woman, might 
suggest that the Court is now applying a form of intermediate scrutiny."  Metzger, supra 
note 116, at 2032.  However,  
This conclusion seems unlikely given the use of rationality review to examine 
regulations imposing burdens not considered to be substantial obstacles.  It is 
particularly noteworthy that Casey appeared to allow states to impose 
restrictions on abortion not amounting to undue burdens in order to achieve a 
legitimate interest, as opposed to the important or substantial state interest 
requirement usually employed under intermediate scrutiny. 
Id. at 2032–33. 
Rather than debating whether the undue burden standard is no more than a form of 
rational basis scrutiny or a failed attempt at intermediate scrutiny, I am silent as to the tier of 
scrutiny represented by the undue burden standard; similarly, I am silent about what tier of 
scrutiny the undue burden standard ought to be.  Instead, I simply contend that, as currently 
deployed, the standard embodies an ideological bias and, consequently, cannot do the job 
that it was designed, and ought, to do. 
968 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (2010) 
strict scrutiny the Court asked not whether a regulation pursued a 
"compelling interest," but rather whether the regulation pursued a 
"morally righteous interest"?153  When constructed in such a way, the 
(corrupted) test would overdetermine the results in any given instance.  
Within such a test, it is unlikely that a state’s interest in "diversity" 
would be "morally righteous" enough to amount to a compelling state 
interest;154 the protection of fetal "life," on the contrary, would likely 
satisfy the demands of "moral righteousness."  This example aims to 
show how the undue burden standard’s reflection of a moral perspective 
compromises its legitimacy as a constitutional test.  While rational basis 
scrutiny might allow for the state to regulate morality, a moral position 
is not built into the test itself.  While strict scrutiny might disallow the 
state from regulating morality, again, a moral position is not built into 
the test itself.  However, a moral position is part and parcel of the 
present undue burden standard.  The nuance here is crucial, as it reveals 
the present undue burden standard to be a judicial innovation—and a 
problematic one. 
The argument that the present undue burden standard embodies an 
ideological bias does not lead to the conclusion that it is necessarily 
unjust, but rather that it is operating unjustly as it is currently deployed.  
Further, my argument is not that the standard is practically unworkable; 
indeed, in the next Part, I will show exactly how a morally agnostic 
version would function. 
Moreover, the reconceptualization that I propose should not lead to 
the conclusion, popular in older versions of critical legal theory 
(especially theory coming out of the school of Critical Legal Studies), 
that the ideological bias locatable in the present undue burden standard 
evidences a characteristic that is common to all legal standards:  It is 
raw power, rather than objective reasoning, that determines both how 
constitutional and other legal tests will be deployed as well as the results 
of that deployment, in any given instance.  This line of argumentation 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Admittedly, within First Amendment jurisprudence, the tests employed by the 
Court tend to, at least, sound as if they have a moral-commitment; that is, they tend to invite 
the judges to determine constitutionality based on the judges’ personally held senses of what 
is moral versus what is immoral.  See Gey, supra note 74, at 338 ("[T]he Court has marked 
the line between protected and unprotected speech by reference to vague, value-laden terms 
such as ‘prurient interest,’ ‘patent offensiveness,’ and ‘serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.’"). 
 154. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:  REQUIREMENTS FOR 
ULTRASOUND 1 (2010), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/ 
spib_RFU.pdf. 
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holds that the present, illegitimate undue burden standard is one 
particular instantiation of an illegitimacy common to all categories; that 
is, that all standards embody a claimant’s version of truth.  This is 
because it is raw power that produces the standards in the first instance, 
or, in the second instance, that determines how they will be used.  The 
argument would continue:  With regard to the undue burden standard as 
currently deployed, it just so happens that the pro-"life"/anti-abortion 
camp has used its political power to embed its ideology regarding the 
fetus into the constitutional standard.  This line of argumentation would 
go on to argue that if the morally agnostic undue burden standard that I 
champion were to be accepted by the Supreme Court, it would not 
change the fact that raw, political power will have determined the 
standard and its operation; in the case of the morally agnostic version of 
the standard, the pro-choice camp would have "captured the Judiciary" 
and embedded its ideology about the fetus’s (lack of) consequential 
moral status into the constitutional test.155  But the morally agnostic 
undue burden standard that I propose does not embody any version of 
truth; accordingly, it does not, and should not, reflect the belief that the 
fetus is not a "life" or is not an entity with moral worth.  Rather, the 
morally agnostic undue burden standard holds no position regarding the 
moral status of the fetus.  If it embodies any truth, it is the truth that one 
does not know, and may not ever know whether or not the fetus is a 
moral subject. 
Having laid out the contours of a morally agnostic undue burden 
standard, how then would that standard operate?  In the next Part, I 
apply the standard that I have proposed to several abortion regulations.  
As the constitutionality of these laws is litigated, it may give the 
Supreme Court the occasion in upcoming terms to articulate how the 
undue burden standard might legitimately operate. 
IV.  The Morally Agnostic Undue Burden Standard in Action 
A.  Mandatory Ultrasound Laws 
Mandatory ultrasound laws range in levels of coerciveness.  The least 
coercive laws simply require that a woman be given either written or verbal 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Cf. Gey, supra note 74, at 332 (arguing that the "logical consequence of a virtually 
unrestrained ‘moral’ political process" is "that constitutional theory must become the servant 
of political power"). 
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information about where she can obtain an ultrasound;156 the most coercive 
laws require that a woman be given an ultrasound as well as a description of 
the image.157  At present, nineteen states have some form of an ultrasound 
requirement.158 
Oklahoma’s mandatory ultrasound law is one of the most severe.  And 
while the law was recently struck down as a violation of the Oklahoma 
constitution’s requirement that laws contain "single subjects,"159 the 
Oklahoma legislature is considering re-passing the law in a form that is 
consistent with the single subject rule.160  For these reasons, it is instructive 
to look at the recently invalidated law, as it likely indicates what mandatory 
ultrasound laws will look like in the future.  The law provided that a 
physician "shall," 
1. Perform an obstetric ultrasound on the pregnant woman, using 
either a vaginal transducer or an abdominal transducer, 
whichever would display the embryo or fetus more clearly; 
2. Provide a simultaneous explanation of what the ultrasound is 
depicting; 
3. Display the ultrasound images so that the pregnant woman may 
view them; [and] 
4. Provide a medical description of the ultrasound images, which 
shall include the dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the 
presence of cardiac activity, if present and viewable, and the 
presence of external members and internal organs, if present 
and viewable . . . .161 
This act probably would pass constitutional muster under the present 
undue burden standard.  That is, the act can be justified as a legitimate 
exercise of a state interested in expressing "profound respect" for fetal 
                                                                                                                 
 156. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 154, at 1. 
 157. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-738.3b (2009) (repealed 2010) (stating the provision). 
 158. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 154, at 2 (listing states’ ultrasound 
requirements).  These states include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin.  Id.  
 159. Press Release, Center for Reproductive Rights, Oklahoma Supreme Court Finds 
Abortion Law Unconstitutional, Upholds State District Court Decision (Mar. 3, 2010), 
http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/oklahoma-supreme-court-finds-abortion-law-
unconstitutional-upholds-state-district-court-d (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 160. See id. (explaining Oklahoma’s possible restructuring of the law). 
 161. Tit. 63 § 1-738.3b. 
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"life."  Oklahoma can persuasively argue that compelling a doctor to relate 
to the woman the raw, objective biological data about the fetus that she 
carries furthers the state’s interest in fetal life.  Indeed, Oklahoma can point 
to language in Casey itself, finding constitutionally permissible state 
informed consent requirements that women be given "truthful, 
nonmisleading information"—including, but not limited to, information 
about the "‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus."162  Oklahoma can argue 
that its law does no more than provide gloss on the significance of the 
fetus’s "probable gestational age" by detailing the physical properties, like 
cardiac activity and developed internal organs, that the fetus has by virtue 
of its probable gestational age.  Oklahoma may even argue that, not only 
does the law fail to impose a substantial obstacle in a woman’s path to an 
abortion, it imposes no obstacle at all.  How could factual information 
about an image, an image away from which a woman may avert her eyes,163 
amount to an obstacle?  My aim in presenting this line of argumentation is 
not to contend that it is convincing; rather, my aim is to demonstrate that 
the argumentation is only convincing under an undue burden standard that 
proceeds from the assumption that the fetus has/is a "life" and that the only 
question is how much protection a state can permissibly afford that "life." 
What would be the disposition of such a law under an undue burden 
standard that was morally agnostic toward the question of fetal life?  The 
Oklahoma law would likely be found constitutionally infirm under such a 
reconceptualized standard.  However, the unconstitutionality of the 
regulation would not be based on the argument that the state subscribed to a 
notion of fetal "life" and passed the law for the purpose of protecting it.  As 
mentioned earlier, within an agnostic undue burden standard, it is legitimate 
for the state to regulate with the purpose of expressing respect for morally 
significant fetal "life"—as long as a morally silent purpose can also be 
divined, or as long as the state requires the women to hear both sides of the 
debate regarding the moral status of the fetus.164  And so, statements 
surrounding the passage of the act that suggest that its purpose was to 
promote a view of "life" would not be dispositive on the question of 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
 163. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-738.3b(C) (2009) (repealed 2010).  The provision invites 
questions as to the permissibility of other forms of refusal that are not expressly "allowed" 
by the law.  May a woman view the ultrasound screen, but plug her ears while her doctor 
gives a "medical description of the ultrasound image," thereby allowing herself the 
opportunity to interpret for herself the image being projected?  May she avert her eyes and 
plug her ears? 
 164. See supra Part III (discussing the morally agnostic undue burden standard). 
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constitutionality.165  Rather, the Court should look at the act in practice and 
determine whether the effect of its requirements is to corrupt the space of 
moral pluralism that ought to surround the abortion decision.166  It is 
difficult to sustain the position that forcing a woman to view an ultrasound 
image of her fetus does not have the effect of imposing a view of the moral 
status of the fetus as an inherently valuable "life."  That is, a Court 
employing a morally agnostic undue burden standard would have to strike 
down mandatory ultrasound viewing laws because of the work that such 
laws do to force upon the woman a particular idea about fetal "life." 
Professor Carol Sanger’s scholarship in this area is instructive.167  
First, Sanger disputes the notion that the image produced by ultrasound 
technology is neutral and objective, that it possesses no ideological 
predilection whatsoever.168  Instead, this visual representation of the fetus 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Accordingly, the Court should not give dispositive weight to statements made 
during legislative debates both for and against the passage of the act.  Nor could the Court 
give dispositive weight to statements made to constituents or to media, like those made by a 
supporter of the bill, Senator Todd Lamb.  When asked why he supported passage of the bill, 
Senator Lamb responded, "‘I introduced the bill because I wanted to encourage life in 
society. In Oklahoma, society is on the side of life.’"  Ron Jenkins, Oklahoma Sued over 
New Abortion Ultrasound Law, SFGATE.COM (Oct. 11, 2008), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/10/11/MN4O13F09F.DTL&type=health (last visited Sept. 24, 
2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 166. Accordingly, the Court might give great weight to the provision in the Oklahoma 
law that legally exempts from penalty a woman who refuses to look at the ultrasound screen 
during the coerced ultrasound.  The clause provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be 
construed to prevent a pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the ultrasound images 
required to be provided to and reviewed with her.  Neither the physician nor the pregnant 
woman shall be subject to any penalty if she refuses to look at the presented ultrasound 
images."  Tit. 63 § 1-738.3b(C).  This provision is particularly fascinating because it 
functions to disavow any claims that the coerced ultrasound is morally neutral, objective, 
and dispassionate.  If the biological and visual data related by a doctor to the woman saddled 
with an unwanted pregnancy were strictly within the realm of impartiality, a woman might 
not feel the need to refuse to look; that the legislature knew of the radical partiality of the 
mere "information" forced upon a woman is evident in its felt need to expressly provide that 
a woman and her doctors would escape penalties if she averts her eyes.  A reviewing Court 
may use this clause as evidence that there is something ideologically charged, and 
impermissibly so, about forcing women to undergo and view an ultrasound prior to an 
abortion.  In essence, the effect of the regulation is to promote an impermissible view of fetal 
"life." 
 167. See generally Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing:  Mandatory Ultrasound and the 
Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008) [hereinafter Sanger, Seeing and 
Believing] (discussing mandatory ultrasounds and their impact on abortion laws). 
 168. See id. at 380 ("To be sure, the sonogram itself has no point of view—it is a 
photograph—and on this account it is offered up as an objective datum incapable of bias.")  
The preamble to Alabama’s mandatory ultrasound viewing law—notably, the "Woman’s 
Right to Know Act"—is representative of this notion, offering fetal imaging as nothing more 
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has a cultural context; it is a context in which excited expectant mommies 
get their first ultrasounds169 and morally significant persons get their photos 
taken.170  Moreover, the woman seeking an abortion—a social being, after 
all—brings an extant cultural knowledge to her viewing of the ultrasound 
that makes impossible any dispassionate or detached understanding of the 
image.171  The result is that the "simple" photograph of the fetus functions 
to make a powerful argument about the fetus’s moral status:  The fetus 
becomes a "life."172  "[T]he ultrasound is meant to establish or simply to 
reinforce the state’s position that the fetus is not just ‘potential life’ . . . but 
‘actual life,’ with all the ideological and emotional force that word now 
comprises and exerts."173  By "cleverly and cruelly capitaliz[ing] on the 
socialized meaning of fetal imagery,"174 mandatory viewing laws 
compromise the space of moral pluralism that should surround the status of 
the fetus because they have the effect of "insisting that women take a 
particular view of fetal existence."175  Understanding this, a Court 
                                                                                                                 
than neutral and objective information.  ALA. CODE § 26-23A-2 (2002).  It reads: 
The decision to abort is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is 
desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and 
consequences.  The medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an 
abortion are serious and can be lasting or life threatening. . . .  [I]t is the purpose 
of this chapter to ensure that every woman considering an abortion receives 
complete information on the procedure, risks, and her alternatives and to ensure 
that every woman who submits to an abortion procedure does so only after 
giving her voluntary and informed consent to the abortion procedure. 
Id. 
 169. See Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 167, at 382 ("Mandatory ultrasound 
laws require women to participate physically in what has become a rite of full-term 
pregnancy: the first ultrasound."). 
 170. See id. at 379 ("[T]he technology and the practice of ultrasound have transformed 
the fetus from potential life to something that can have its picture taken, a trait which in our 
visual culture is as close to a marker of personhood as one can get."). 
 171. See id. ("Preexisting cultural familiarity with the public fetus and its status as an 
independent person, patient, and consumer has made affinity with one’s own fetus an easy 
and natural next step."). 
 172. See id. at 406 ("[T]he imagery is rarely neutral, or at least rarely received as 
neutral.  For some it powerfully represents nothing less than life."). 
 173. Id. at 377.  Moreover, not only is the fetus a "life," but it is also a baby—the 
aborting woman’s baby.  See id. at 378 ("[T]hese statutes are unabashedly meant to 
transform the embryo or fetus from an abstraction to a baby in the eyes of the potentially 
aborting mother.").  Through compelling a woman to view her ultrasound, she is encouraged 
to comprehend her abortion as killing her baby. 
 174. Id. at 406. 
 175. Id. at 408. 
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reviewing such statutes with an agnostic undue burden standard must strike 
them down as unconstitutional. 
An agnostic undue burden standard would compel those desiring to 
protect fetal "life" to pursue their purpose with more ideologically neutral 
means or in ways that would not impose their moral worldviews on women 
or physicians.  Accordingly, a potentially permissible version of the 
Oklahoma statute and other mandatory viewing laws might provide that a 
woman seeking abortion services be given the option of receiving an 
ultrasound and having the image described to her.  Moreover, these laws 
might be saved from unconstitutionality if it provided that women "shall" 
also receive information about the fetus that proceeds from different 
assumptions.  Accordingly, subsequent (or prior) to an ultrasound in which 
a physician provides a "medical description" of the image, a woman might 
also be informed that the image is not dispositive of fetal "life."  She might 
be given information about how the biological fact of the fetus has become 
conceptualized as coincident with an idea of morally significant "life."  She 
might be engaged in a discussion about how varying schools of thought 
throughout history have held differing views regarding the beginning of 
"life."176  She might be encouraged to consider that it is she, ultimately, who 
must reconcile her own personally held views regarding "life" with her 
decision to terminate or continue her present pregnancy.  An abortion 
regulation that compels the woman to engage in a conversation regarding 
"life" that is not overdetermined—that presents the belief that "life" begins 
at conception together with the belief that "life" is a vapid term that has 
been co-opted by a social movement that is not empowered to determine the 
origins of morally significant "life"—would not likely fall into the category 
of an unduly burdensome regulation.  Such a conversation is congruent with 
an agnosticism toward fetal life. 
It is important to mention that the conversation that I have described 
may ultimately persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion, as she 
may become convinced that her fetus is a "life" and that the fact of fetal 
"life" prohibits her from terminating her pregnancy.  Indeed, the state may 
have enacted the regulation that provides an opportunity for such a 
conversation with the purpose of ultimately persuading a woman to come to 
this conclusion.  However, the state may not coerce women to reach such 
                                                                                                                 
 176. The history given in Roe might be an instructive launching pad for such a 
discussion.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130–47 (1973) (examining approaches taken to 
abortion in "ancient attitudes," "The Hippocratic Oath," "the common law," "English 
statutory law," "American law," "the position of the American Medical Association," and 
"the position[s] of the American Public Health," and "American Bar Association[s]").  
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conclusions by providing them with only one side of the relevant debate.  
Accordingly, the state must present all arguments surrounding questions of 
fetal life.  Moreover, it is through the presentation of such arguments—a 
presentation that clears a space for the flourishing of moral pluralism 
around the question of the fetus—that the state may, legitimately, express 
its "profound respect" for the fetus. 
B.  Fetal Pain Laws 
As of September 2009, nine states had passed fetal pain laws, which 
require that women be told that their fetuses are capable of feeling pain.177  
Georgia’s statute is representative, requiring that women be informed that, 
By 20 weeks’ gestation, the unborn child has the physical structures 
necessary to experience pain.  There is evidence that by 20 weeks’ 
gestation unborn children seek to evade certain stimuli in a manner 
which in an infant or an adult would be interpreted to be a response to 
pain.  Anesthesia is routinely administered to unborn children who are 
20 weeks gestational age or older who undergo prenatal surgery.178 
Fetal pain laws are problematic for many reasons, the most important 
one being that they may be misleading.  In a helpful analysis, Harper Tobin 
describes how each of the statements that abortion providers must relate to 
their patients under these laws could mislead the lay hearer into believing 
that the scientific community has reached the conclusion that the fetus feels 
pain during an abortion procedure.179  She notes that simply because the 
structures necessary for pain perception are in place, "their mere presence is 
insufficient," as they are not fully functional at early gestational ages.180  
She notes that while fetuses may demonstrate "evasive responses 
superficially suggestive of pain," there is considerable debate that "pain is 
actually experienced."181  Finally, she notes that while "anesthesia is 
routinely administered to" fetuses undergoing prenatal surgery, the 
anesthesia serves purposes completely unrelated to preventing the fetus 
                                                                                                                 
 177. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Texas, and Utah.  GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 154, at 2.  The federal 
government considered, but failed to pass a similar bill in 2006.  See Unborn Child Pain 
Awareness Act of 2006, H.R. 6099, 109th Cong. (2006) (stating the proposed legislation). 
 178. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-4(a)(3) (2006). 
 179. Tobin, supra note 36, at 147. 
 180. Id. at 144. 
 181. Id. at 146. 
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from feeling pain, including "inhibiting fetal movement during a [medical] 
procedure," allowing access to the fetus, and preventing contractions and 
separation of the placenta.182 
Moreover, the quasi-truthful, yet nevertheless misleading information 
that Georgia requires a woman to hear unconstitutionally communicates the 
state’s message about the fetus’s moral status.  The ability of an entity to 
feel pain—that is, that a thing is a sentient being—invariably speaks to the 
moral status of the entity, as well as the respect and deference that ought to 
be afforded to it.  The misrepresentation of the sentient capacities of the 
fetus accordingly misrepresents information that is relevant to the question 
of the fetus’s moral status.  Again, this is something that the state may not 
do.  The woman seeking an abortion must be left a space, free of 
intentionally misleading information,183 to contemplate her fetus’s moral 
status and the consequences of that status on her decision to terminate her 
pregnancy.  Under an agnostic undue burden standard, misinformation of 
the kind mandated by Georgia unconstitutionally contracts that space.  
C.  Declaratory Laws 
An interesting crop of abortion regulations are those that declare the 
fetus’s moral status.  At present, only South Dakota184 and North Dakota185 
have passed such laws.  Both regulations require that, as part of the 
informed consent process, women be told that the abortion procedure to 
which they are endeavoring to consent will "terminate the life of a whole, 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Id. at 147 (quoting Susan L. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary 
Review of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947, 952 (2005)). 
 183. Jeremy Blumenthal has done provocative work on how the stressful conditions 
involved in seeking abortion services (and, simply, bearing an unwanted pregnancy) may 
leave persons in a vulnerable state and less inclined to be critical towards the information 
communicated to them; that is, persons are more easily persuaded when they are 
experiencing negative emotional states.  See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, 
and Emotion:  Implications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2008) (explaining the findings).  He concludes, "[E]ven a truthful 
message may be misleading when it inappropriately takes advantage of emotional influence 
to bias an individual’s decision away from the decision that would be made in a non-
emotional, fully informed state."  Id. at 27.  He suggests that "the sort of emotional 
information that many States now provide in their ‘informed consent’ statutes can lead to 
such inappropriate emotional influence and thus should be examined more closely than 
heretofore."  Id. 
 184. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2009). 
 185. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 14-02.1-02  (2009). 
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separate, unique, living human being."186  South Dakota’s law also requires 
that women be told that "the pregnant woman has an existing relationship 
with that unborn human being and that the relationship enjoys protection 
under the United States Constitution and under the laws of South 
Dakota."187  In the challenge to South Dakota’s law, the district court 
granted a preliminary injunction.188 When comparing the South Dakota 
provision to the informed consent provision found constitutional in Casey, 
the court stated,  
Unlike the truthful, nonmisleading medical and legal information 
doctors were required to disclose in Casey, the South Dakota statute 
requires abortion doctors to enunciate the State’s viewpoint on an 
unsettled medical, philosophical, theological, and scientific issue, that is, 
whether a fetus is a human being.189 
The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, overruled, however, finding that 
"‘human being’ in this case means ‘an individual living member of the 
species of Homo sapiens . . . during [its] embryonic [or] fetal age."190  
Essentially, the court found that there was no ideological bias or theological 
underpinnings beneath the pronouncement that abortion terminates the "life 
of a . . . living human being."191 
                                                                                                                 
 186. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 14-02.1-02 
 (2009). 
 187. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2009). 
 188. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D., v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889 
(D.S.D. 2005). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D., v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735–36 (8th Cir. 
2008). This definition of "human being" was found in a different section of the South Dakota 
code.  Id. at 727.  Women were not required to be given this statutory definition; 
consequently, women, in practice, would only hear the statement that abortion terminates the 
life of a "whole, separate, unique, living human being"—a statement that is reasonably 
interpreted as "address[ing] whether the embryo or fetus is a ‘whole, separate, unique’ 
‘human life’ in the metaphysical sense."  Id. at 736 n.9.  As Post explains: 
A reasonable patient, upon being informed that she is terminating the life of a 
"human being," would not understand her doctor to be informing her that she is 
ending the life of a biological member of the species Homo sapiens.  She would 
understand her doctor to be informing her that she is ending the life of a member 
of the human community who otherwise deserves life.  Because this is the 
meaning that the term "human being" carries in debates about abortion, this is 
the way that the doctor’s speech will be received and understood. 
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion:  A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled 
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 958. 
 191. Planned Parenthood Minn., 530 F.3d at 726. The dissent notes that the term 
"human being" is subject to multiple meanings; while it may "refer to purely biological 
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A Supreme Court deploying an undue burden standard with agnostic 
commitments might find the circuit court’s reasoning a bit disingenuous.  It 
might argue that "life" and "living human being" have been co-opted by a 
social movement that seeks to endow those words and concepts with 
meaning that goes beyond a purely biological definition.192  Moreover, the 
Court might advise legislatures considering similar language for their 
state’s  informed consent processes that it may save such regulations from 
unconstitutionality if women were also presented a differing ideological 
view of fetal "life" (i.e., that the fetus is a biological entity whose 
ontological status as a morally significant "life" is unresolved), or if those 
informed consent processes make clear that they were referring to 
biological life as opposed to a theological/moral notion of "life" (i.e., 
physicians should explain that the abortion procedure "terminates the 
existence of a member of the species of Homo sapiens during its embryonic 
or fetal age").193  Simply stated, declaratory laws like those of South and 
North Dakota impose upon the woman a particular conception of the moral 
status of the fetus and would be struck down by a Court employing an 
agnostic undue burden standard. 
D.  Casey-Like Informed Consent Requirements 
The informed consent requirements that were found constitutional in 
Casey, mandating that women be informed about the nature of the abortion 
procedure,194 the health risks attendant to abortion and childbirth, and the 
                                                                                                                 
characteristics"—denoting a "bipedal mammal that is anatomically related to the great 
apes"—it "also may be a value judgment, indicating entitlement to the moral or political 
rights shared by all persons."  Id. at 742 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  In profound disagreement 
with the majority’s conclusion that there is no ideological foundation beneath the 
pronouncement that "abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living 
human being," the dissent wrote, "In the context of abortion, the term ‘human being’ has an 
overwhelmingly subjective, normative meaning, in some sense encompassing the whole 
philosophical debate about the procedure."  Id.  
 192. See Dresser, supra note 63, at 1615 (noting that the law in South Dakota "is 
seeking to impose consent demands that are . . . more unconventional, by requiring doctors 
to give women one position on the moral status of the developing fetus—a position not 
shared by many people in the United States"). 
 193. See id. at 1622 ("If the government requires women to receive material about the 
moral value of developing human life, that material should describe the range of views 
people have on the topic."). 
 194. Of course, there are multiple ways to describe an abortion procedure—some more 
emotionally charged and morally committed than others.  The description of the abortion 
procedure that women hear ought to be one that proceeds from a morally agnostic view of 
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probable gestational age of the fetus, would likely pass constitutional 
muster under a morally agnostic undue burden standard.195  While they 
were probably passed by a legislature convinced of the significant moral 
status of the fetus, and while they were almost certainly passed with the 
purpose of convincing women to carry their fetuses to term, these purposes 
are not patently revealed in the effect of the statute.  On their face, such 
informed consent requirements seem to do nothing more than supply 
women with enough information about their pregnancies and the abortion 
process such that the decisions that they make to end their pregnancies are 
sufficiently informed.196  Likewise, requiring that abortion providers give 
                                                                                                                 
the fetus; accordingly, as a baseline, it must be vigilant in its use of medical terminology.  
For example, a woman should be told that her "cervix will be dilated so that the physician 
can insert a vacuum aspirator into the uterus; thereafter, a suction will be used to empty the 
contents of the uterus"; she should not be told that her "cervix will be dilated so that the 
physician can insert a ‘vacuum’ into the ‘womb’ and suck the ‘baby’ out." 
 195. Moreover, the informed consent requirements that were struck down in Akron, 
requiring physicians to inform their patients that "the unborn child is a human life from the 
moment of conception," would likely be found unconstitutional under an agnostic undue 
burden standard; such a statement, purporting to describe as fact "one theory of when life 
begins," undoubtedly constricts the space of moral pluralism around the fertilized egg, the 
embryo, and the fetus.  See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 423 n.5, 
444 (1983) (describing the statements required under the informed consent law).  For the 
same reasons, such statements would be unconstitutional even if only found in the preamble 
to a state Act—even if they were not required to be expressed directly to a woman burdened 
with an unwanted pregnancy.  See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504, 506 
(1989) (refusing to rule on the constitutionality of a Missouri act’s preamble, which stated 
that "the life of each human being begins at conception" and that "unborn children have 
protectable interests in life, health, and well-being").  Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent in 
Webster, would have struck down the preamble because of his belief that it would have "the 
unconstitutional effect of chilling the exercise of a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy 
and of burdening the freedom of health professionals to provide abortion services."  Id. at 
539 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Although a Court employing an agnostic undue burden 
standard would reach the same result as Justice Blackmun, the rationale of the decision 
would be based on the likelihood that the preamble would chill the flourishing of positions 
around the question of the fetus’s moral status. 
 196. Interestingly, one can trace back to Casey the Court’s concern in Carhart with the 
psychological consequences of abortion, and the possibility that a woman may come to 
regret her decision to abort.  In upholding the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s informed 
consent requirements, the Casey plurality wrote, "In attempting to ensure that a woman 
apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of 
reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with 
devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed."  Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).  Indeed, one may trace the 
Court’s concern with the psychological consequences of abortion all the way back to Roe, 
when Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion showed concern about the psychological 
consequences to the woman of not being able to procure an abortion.  He wrote: 
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life 
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women "information about medical assistance for childbirth, information 
about child support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide 
adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion"197 does not have a 
singular moral effect.  While such information may dissuade some women 
from terminating their pregnancies, this effect would not be due to the state 
having compelled the woman to accept its moral view of the fetus; the 
effect would be due to women being informed of options that they did not 
know they had—an effect that is completely independent of any moral 
suasion regarding the fetus.  In truth, the informed consent requirements 
would be more accurate if, in addition to notifying women about the 
availability of state assistance if they carry their fetuses to term, they also 
notified women about the diminishment of privacy rights that they could 
expect if they came to rely upon public assistance, as well as the wholesale 
problematization of mothers who rely on public assistance within cultural 
                                                                                                                 
and future.  Psychological harm may be imminent.  Mental and physical health 
may be taxed by child care.  There is also the distress . . . associated with the 
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family 
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).  Commenting on this paragraph, one scholar has 
noted, "While couched in the terms of justifying women’s ability to choose whether or not to 
have children, the psychological rationale expressed here is later employed to justify the 
opposite end."  Ivey, supra note 36, at 1478. 
Scholars have observed that while Casey understood the possibility that women would 
come to regret an abortion decision that was not fully informed as a reason to provide 
information to them, Carhart understands this same possibility as a reason to take the 
abortion decision out of their hands completely.  See Dresser, supra note 63, at 1608–09 ("In 
Casey, the woman’s potential regret justified making available to her supplementary 
information about abortion and her other options, but in Gonzales, it justified removing the 
abortion choice altogether.").  Dresser goes on to summarize the jurisprudence concerning 
the informational obligations of the state as follows: 
The Supreme Court has gone from saying that the government may not require, 
as part of informed consent, information that is designed to discourage the 
abortion choice, to saying that the government may require such material so that 
women will make ‘mature and informed’ decisions and will be protected from 
later regret, to saying that the government may simply eliminate an abortion 
choice so that women are protected both from anxiety that adequate information 
could provoke and from the regret that could come if later they were to learn 
that information. 
Id. at 1617; see also Ivey, supra note 36, at 1469 ("While Roe emphasizes the importance of 
women’s reproductive privacy and health, and Casey recognizes [a] women’s ‘ability to 
control their reproductive lives,’ Gonzales . . . suggests . . . women, while they retain the 
abortion right, must be protected from some of what the right confers upon them."). 
 197. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881. 
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discourses.198  Nevertheless, the absence of this important, entirely truthful 
information does not threaten the constitutionality of the statute as is. 
Moreover, mandatory twenty-four- and forty-eight-hour waiting periods 
do not have the effect of producing meaning regarding the moral status of the 
fetus.  Accordingly, the morally agnostic undue burden standard would not be 
capable of striking down such a statute on the grounds that it contracts the 
space of moral pluralism that ought to surround the abortion right.  However, 
a Court reviewing such a law need not look to the effects that the law has on a 
woman’s freedom to contemplate her fetus’s moral status in order to find a 
mandatory waiting period constitutionally infirm; rather, the Court need only 
look to the actual effects that such laws have on the women that they impact.  
That is, while a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period might not be a 
"substantial obstacle" for the nonpoor woman living in Manhattan, it might 
effectively preclude the availability of a legal abortion for the poor woman 
living in rural South Dakota;199 indeed, a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting 
period might be an absolute obstacle to the poor woman who has only one day 
off from work, or only enough money to cover the cost of one round-trip bus 
ticket.200  Which is to argue:  Although the morally agnostic undue burden 
standard will strike down laws because they impose a moral position on 
women, it does not preclude the standard from also striking down laws because 
they have the effect of imposing a "substantial obstacle" on some, although not 
all, women.201 
                                                                                                                 
 198. See generally Khiara M. Bridges, Pregnancy, Medicaid, State Regulation, and the 
Production of Unruly Bodies, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 62 (2008) (explaining the author of 
this Article’s view). 
 199. See Metzger, supra note 116, at 2038 ("Yet regulations that are not burdensome in 
Pennsylvania may well be burdensome in other states where there are fewer abortion 
providers or a more rural and poorer population[,] . . . [t]hus some women may be denied 
effective exercise of their constitutional right to choose abortion."). 
 200. Metzger makes an interesting argument that the undue burden standard should 
utilize the analysis used for content-neutral, traditional forum speech in First Amendment 
cases, which requires a consideration of how the restriction on speech would affect less 
wealthy individuals and groups.  See id. at 2067 ("[I]t appears that the alternative channels 
inquiry continues to involve a focus on the impact of a regulation on people with few 
resources.").  Metzger argues that if this consideration were reflected in the undue burden 
standard, it would render unconstitutional regulations that function to increase the cost of 
abortion, making the procedure economically unavailable to poorer women.  Id. at 2068 
("The Court would determine whether increased costs are slight or substantial explicitly 
from this perspective.  If the Court found that a regulation would result in a significant 
increase in the cost of an abortion, the regulation would be struck down for imposing an 
undue burden."). 
 201. There may be much gained from an undue burden standard that takes into 
consideration differing subject positions, thereby enabling it to ask not just if a regulation 
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V.  Some Concluding Thoughts 
The Supreme Court, in its recent abortion jurisprudence, is proceeding 
from the assumption that the fetus is/has a morally significant "life."  This 
conception of the fetus corrupts the undue burden standard and, consequently, 
overdetermines the questions posed by that standard; moreover, it also 
overdetermines the answers to those questions.  I have proposed replacing the 
present, morally committed undue burden standard with an agnostic version 
that assumes the radical and fundamental unknowability of the ontological 
status of the fetus.  This reformulation of the undue burden standard will enable 
the Court to ask different questions about abortion regulations—questions 
which do not invite only one set of answers. 
A critic may argue that, while it is arbitrary to privilege the position that 
the fetus is/has a "life" over an agnostic view of the fetus in abortion 
jurisprudence, it is equally arbitrary to privilege a position of agnosticism over 
one of fetal "life."  Further, faced with arbitrariness without regard to which 
position one privileges, we make no mistakes by maintaining the status quo.  
My response is that, while the privileging of either position may be arbitrary, 
one accords better with the stories that we like to tell about this nation.  
Moreover, the position that is more congruent with our vision of this country is 
an agnosticism towards fetal life. 
That the state has the power within its far-reaching police power to 
regulate things that touch on the morality of its citizenry, in order to protect the 
moral welfare of is subjects, is a proposition that is still accepted.  However, 
history teaches that states ought to proceed with caution when attempting to 
construct or protect the moral soundness of the people; the propriety of moral 
positions is highly contentious and is subject to the vicissitudes of time and 
experience.  Moreover, those periods in which the state forces its moral 
judgment upon large segments of the population that do not share its moral 
commitments tend to be looked back upon, always in retrospect, as unfortunate 
times in this nation’s history.  And so, that period in which the state undertook 
                                                                                                                 
imposes an undue burden, but also to whom might a regulation impose an undue burden.  See 
Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Postmodern World:  A Flying Elephant, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 673, 686 (1999) (noting that "[o]utgroup scholars, when confronted with the 
same event, were more likely to recognize the existence of multiple truths").  This undue 
burden standard would not unwittingly, yet invariably, reiterate the marginalization of some 
classes (and, disproportionately, races) of women, as it would take into account the 
multiplicity of subject positions within society.  As such, this undue burden standard would 
"better suit[] the contemporary ‘complexity of human society’ than a constitutional 
jurisprudence based on categorically defined rights, with violations invariably subject to 
rigorous review."  Appleton, supra note 99, at 61. 
CAPTURING THE JUDICIARY 983 
to protect its subjects from the "immorality" of alcohol consumption by 
compelling temperance is looked at, in retrospect, as unfortunate—a 
demonstration of moral righteousness that ultimately revealed itself as moral 
folly.202  Similarly, those periods in which the state undertook to protect its 
subjects from the "immorality" of nonmarital sex is looked at, in retrospect, as 
unfortunate—a demonstration of a fascistic moral zealousness.  And I am 
hopeful that the time will come when that period of time in which the state 
endeavored to protect its subjects from "homosexuals" and "homosexuality" 
can be looked at, in retrospect, as unfortunate—a demonstration of moral 
righteousness that ultimately revealed itself to be, simply put, wrong.203 
Further, the privileging in constitutional law of moral agnosticism over 
fetal "life" is consistent with the moral and theological positions regarding fetal 
"life" held by judges and Justices who may, personally, believe that "life" 
begins at conception and the fetus and the life it possesses is always already 
valuable; accordingly, judges and Justices who are themselves convinced of the 
existence and value of fetal "life" may, nevertheless, utilize the morally 
agnostic undue burden standard to invalidate regulations that their personal 
beliefs may lead them to find desirable, if not required.  This reconciliation 
between warring worldviews occurs because the agnostic undue burden 
standard is an institutional requirement that must be employed by the actors 
occupying the institutional role; accordingly, the men and women assuming 
judicial positions are required to bracket their own personal beliefs when 
performing the duties pursuant to that role.204  That is, it is illegitimate for the 
law and its enactors to take cognizance of certain convictions, beliefs, and/or 
theories.  The belief—indeed, the faith—that the fetus is an always already 
                                                                                                                 
 202. In truth, Prohibition was likely justified on the grounds of the state’s interest in 
protecting public morality as well as public health.  See Goldberg, supra note 96, at 1245 
("[T]he Court’s older cases frequently sustained alcohol-related restrictions in the interests 
of the public health and morality."); id. at 1262 ("[A]s much as those . . . cases dramatize . . . 
moral threat[s] posed by alcohol, the Court never [relied on] the morality concern . . . alone; 
rather, risks to the public health and other secondary effects associated with alcohol 
consumption, such as crime, loomed at least as large as . . . moral decline."). 
 203. Here, I reference the fact that the right of gay and lesbian persons to marry their 
partners has continued to be denied on both the federal and state levels.  However, 
Lawrence’s holding that it is unconstitutional for the state to criminalize the sexual acts of 
gay and lesbian persons is, undeniably, a welcome step in the direction of ridding the nation 
of state-enforced morality.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("Bowers was not 
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.  It ought not to remain binding 
precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick  should be and now is overruled."). 
 204. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) ("Some of 
us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that 
cannot control our decision[;] [o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate 
our own moral code."). 
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valuable "life" is one of those illegitimate beliefs that has no place in law.  
Consider on this point Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy,  
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  And so 
it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power.  So, 
I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great 
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.  But in view 
of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, 
dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our Constitution 
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.  In 
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.  The humblest is 
the peer of the most powerful.  The law regards man as man, and takes no 
account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as 
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.205 
In his dissent, Justice Harlan essentially argues that the White race is 
superior to the Black race.  Judges can be convinced of it; it can be a conviction 
that no amount of evidence can disprove for them.  Indeed, Harlan appears to 
believe that as long as the White race "remains true to its great heritage and 
holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty," it will maintain its 
superiority over all other races.  However, Justice Harlan was also equally 
convinced that the White race cannot use the law as a means to facilitate its 
superiority.  Analogously, many of those opposed to an abortion right may 
believe that the fetus has/is a "life."  Judges can be convinced of the fact of fetal 
"life"; it can be a conviction that the image of the fetus serves to simply 
reiterate as truth for them.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy appears to believe the 
simple, elegant fact of fetal "life"; it is such a truism that he can state, without 
citations, that the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 proscribes a particular 
manner of ending fetal life—with no indications that some believe "life" to be 
an overdetermined, yet vapid word that describes too much, yet not enough, 
whenever it is evoked.  Surely, Kennedy is not the only Justice who presently 
sits on the Supreme Court who subscribes to the theory of fetal "life."  But, as 
institutional actors, it is illegitimate for them to take cognizance of this theory 
when they are performing their institutional role.  That is, if the "White race" 
could not use the law as a means to facilitating the end of White supremacy, 
believers in fetal "life," similarly, cannot use the law as a means to facilitating 
the end of reiterating their particular theory of fetal moral ontology. 
                                                                                                                 
 205. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  There is, of 
course, much more to say about Carhart, race, and racial justice.  I will, indeed, say much 
more in future scholarship. 
